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1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the economic determinants that underlie sovereign CDS
pricing errors. The main aim is to ascertain systematic patterns in price divergences from
a theoretical non-arbitrage term-structure CDS model stemming from market frictions,
transaction costs, and local or global illiquidity conditions. The central hypothesis is
that illiquidity-related factors cause declines in arbitrage activity and, hence, price devia-
tions from fundamental values, as discussed by Merton (1987), Tuckman and Vila (1992),
Schleifer and Vishny (1997), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Duffie (2010), among
others. As acknowledged in this literature, arbitrage is an inherently risky and costly ac-
tivity due to market inefficiencies which makes arbitrageurs reluctant to trade when the
cost of implementing their strategies is prohibitive. Similarly, the existence of capital
constraints and/or capital rescissions, typically observed during market downturning sce-
narios, impose limits to the strength of arbitrage. As a result, the lack of sufficient arbitrage
capital breaks the general agreement about pricing and enables assets to be traded in equi-
librium at prices significantly different from their fundamental values. In this context,
trading and holding costs as well as other market variables which are expected to have a
strong influence on arbitrage capital could explain and even predict price divergences. The
study of the role played by such illiquidity-related factors would be particularly insightful
in markets which are usually characterized by intense professional arbitrage activity, such
as the sovereign CDS market. Like other key aspects involved in the price formation pro-
cess of these derivative contracts, however, little is formally known on this issue because
active CDS trading is a relatively new phenomenon.
This paper strives to contribute to the extant literature and the general understanding on
how CDS prices are formed by analyzing the informational content of pricing errors in the
sovereign segment, characterizing when mispricing is more likely to occur, and pinpoint-
ing the main factors that drive and even predict fundamental-value divergences. To this
end, we implement robust panel-data techniques –including two-way cluster errors, fixed-
effect panel data, instrumental-variable (IV) and GMM-based panel data estimation– on a
broad sample of weekly sovereign CDS spreads in 16 advanced and emerging economies
in the period 2008 to 2012. In this analysis, contemporaneous (lagged) values of different
illiquidity-related variables that capture transaction costs and proxy for changes in arbi-
trage capital at the individual level are used to explain (forecast) a suitable measure of
CDS term-structure price divergence when controlling for a number of alternative factors.
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The measure of price discrepancy, adapted from Hu et al. (2013), is defined as the log-
arithm of the average root mean square deviation between the market and a theoretical
model-implied CDS term structure at a particular date. The main discussion follows for
the analysis based on theoretical prices generated by the arbitrage-free default-intensity
model in Pan and Singleton (2008). For the sake of robustness, however, we alternatively
consider the spline-type model in Nelson and Siegel (1987) and the conditional default
probability curve in Houweling and Vorst (2005), noting that the main results are not
driven by the particular choice of the theoretical CDS term-structure pricing model.1
The main evidence from this analysis us to draw several conclusions. The most im-
portant result is that there exists a strong empirical connection between market-wide illiq-
uidity factors and sovereign CDS missvaluation. In particular, larger bid-ask spreads (the
most usual proxy for illiquidity and transaction costs in the extant literature) are system-
atically related to larger CDS pricing errors, both contemporaneously and in one-week
ahead periods. Similarly, increments in the number of CDS offsetting transactions (a mea-
sure of effective trading activity) tend to increase pricing errors, mainly, in the segment
of advanced economies. The general rationale for these general findings lies in the ex-
istence of a link that ties arbitrage activity to market illiquidity, as discussed previously.
Consequently, the empirical evidence in this paper provides empirical support for the gen-
eral suitability of the theoretical claims of the limit-to-arbitrage literature in the specific
context of sovereign CDS markets.
In addition, this paper provides clear insight into the systematic patterns –both in the
time-series and in the cross-section– that characterize mispricing in sovereign CDS mar-
kets. As expected under the arbitrage capital hypothesis, price deviations substantially in-
crease during periods of financial distress such as Lehman’s collapse in September 2008,
or the Greek bailout in March 2010. Pricing errors are mostly contributed by divergences
at the 1-year maturity, which could be related to limited cash vehicles with which to hedge
such instrument, as discussed by Pan and Singleton (2008). Structural differences in cred-
1There exists several methods for pricing default swaps. On the one hand, a common practice in the
industry is to bootstrap the survival probabilities from the observed quotes. To this end, both nonparametric
(piecewise constant hazard rates) and parametric (Nelson and Siegel, 1987) interpolation methods are com-
monly used in practice. On the other hand, the intensity modeling approach has been extensively accepted
among researches for pricing fixed income instruments such as corporate bonds (Lando (1998) or Duffie
and Singleton, 1999) and default swaps (Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), Pan and Singleton (2008) and
Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton, 2011).
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itworthiness between advanced and emerging economies are also responsible of system-
atic differences in pricing errors in the cross-section. Furthermore, pricing errors exhibit
sizable cross-country commonalities that suggest that systematic mispricing in the CDS
market is (partially) driven by global trends. A simple principal component analysis re-
veals that about 50% of the total variation in pricing errors can be explained by two prin-
cipal components. The projection of the first component on market-wide illiquidity- and
volatility-related factors results in statistically significant coefficients and R2 measures of
about 26%, suggesting that this latent factor can be related to global market illiquidity.
From a more sophisticated perspective, and as discussed previously, the panel-data anal-
ysis shows that the price divergences significantly covariate with market-wide illiquidity
measures after controlling for other potential drivers, leading to R2 measures of about 95%.
These conclusions hold after controlling for a number of macroeconomic and financial
state variables, using different estimation techniques, and different pricing models. The
overall implication is that sovereign CDS prices must be driven by different risk factors
which include, at least, a time-varying source of non-diversifiable illiquidity risk. This in-
terpretation is consistent with the increasing evidence about the existence of an illiquidity
component in credit markets in general, and CDS in particular.
This paper belongs to the stream of literature devoted to CDS pricing and illiquidity.
A non-exhaustive review of this literature includes the papers by Longstaff et al. (2005),
Tang and Yan (2008), Bongaerts, Jong and Driessen (2011), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam
and Mahanti (2011) or Corò, Dufour and Varotto (2013), among others. Earlier studies
in this field argued that CDS prices may not be significantly affected by liquidity because
their specific contractual nature makes it possible to easily trade large notional amounts
compared to bond markets; see, for instance, Longstaff et al. (2005) and Blanco, Brennan
and Marsh (2005). However, the recent literature largely supports the hypothesis that
CDS prices are driven by a default risk factor and (at least) an illiquidity-risk factor; see,
among others, Tang and Yan (2008), Bongaerts et al. (2011), Junge and Trolle (2014), and
references therein. For instance, in a recent analysis on corporate CDS spreads, Corò et al.
(2013) conclude that liquidity risk is even more important than firm-specific credit risk
regardless of market conditions. The empirical evidence in the current paper, showing that
illiquidity-related factors are largely responsible of pricing errors in non-arbitrage default
intensity models, supports the claims in this branch of literature.
This paper also belongs to the literature centered on the analysis of the economic deter-
4
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minants of pricing errors from arbitrage-free pricing models and its diverse implications,
particularly in derivative markets. Jarrow, Li and Ye (2011) characterize arbitrage oppor-
tunities from a non-arbitrage pricing model under a CIR specification, showing how to
implement profitable strategies in this context; see also Duffie (1999). Our paper adopts a
different approach and examines the systematic sources of CDS mispricing. The idea of
comparing market prices with theoretical prices obtained from a non-arbitrage model to
inform about market liquidity is contained in Berenguer, Gimeno and Nave (2013), who
study the role of liquidity on the deviations of sovereign bonds yields from a theoretical
liquidity-free term structure of interest rates. Within the CDS literature, Nashikkar et al.
(2011) approach the CDS-bond basis by computing the difference between market and a
theoretically-implied CDS spread under the theoretical constraint of a constant default-
intensity model. More recently, Junge and Trolle (2014) construct a measure of market
illiquidity in CDS market based on divergences between published credit index levels and
their theoretical counterparts.
While we are not aware of other papers dealing with mispricing in CDS markets, sev-
eral studies have analyzed the drivers of pricing errors in other derivative exchanges. Peña,
Rubio and Serna (1999) characterize the determinants of the implied volatility function in
European options under the Black-Scholes model. These authors show that the curvature
of the implied-volatility function increases on the size of bid-ask spreads, which implies a
clear link between pricing errors and transaction costs. Similar results have been reported
for other derivative products, such as interest-rate options. The evidence in Deuskar, Gupta
and Subrahmanyam (2008) is particularly relevant for our paper because, like CDS con-
tracts, interest-rate options are traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where liquidity-
providers are more sensitive to market conditions. Although our methodological approach
differs substantially, the overall results completely agree with the general evidence re-
ported in these studies: Pricing errors in derivative contracts are generally sensitive to
market-wide illiquidity.
Finally, our paper builds on a price discrepancy measure built in the spirit of Hu et al.
(2013). This study complements their paper in two main ways. First, by discussing the
generality and suitability of the noise measure, originally implemented in the context of
Treasury bond exchanges, in other markets. Secondly, by reporting evidence showing that
this measure does indeed correlate with market-wide liquidity conditions from a different
methodological approach. While Hu et al. (2013) use the measure in an asset-pricing
5
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analysis, we analyze the determinants that ultimately underlie greater price discrepancies
in the different context of sovereign CDS markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the noise or pricing
discrepancy measure used in our analysis and discusses its suitability for the sovereign
CDS market. Section 3 presents the dataset and the econometric framework used to char-
acterize the price discrepancy measure, discussing the main features exhibited by the re-
sultant estimates in the sample. Section 4 analyzes the determinants and the predictability
of pricing errors considering a broad set of market-wide indicators. Section 5 conducts
several robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. Pricing errors in the CDS term structure
This section formalizes the theoretical relation between CDS spreads at different ma-
turities in an arbitrage-free setting and introduces the main concepts as well as the notation
used throughout the paper. It also examines the link between arbitrage capital and pricing
errors in CDS markets, introducing the discrepancy or noise measure proposed by Hu et al.
(2013), and a discussion on its general suitability in the context of this paper.
2.1. Mispricing and arbitrage opportunities in the CDS term structure
The theoretical arguments used here are primarily taken from Jarrow et al. (2011). To
introduce the notation and outline the formal demonstration, consider the price at time t of
a CDS with maturity m, denoted CDSt(m), defined as certain function of the risk-neutral
default probability, λQt , say CDSt(m)= f mt (λ
Q
t ). Under usual assumptions, a second-order
Taylor expansion of the theoretical CDS price function at time s = t +∆t yields
f mt (λ
Q
s ) = f
m
t (λ
Q
t )+(λQs −λQt )Hm1t +
1
2
(λQs −λQt )2Hm2t +O
((
λ˜Qs
)3)
, (1)
where ∆t denotes a short period of time, λ˜Qs is a midpoint in the line that joins λQs and
λQt , and O(·) is a (bounded) remaining term. The terms Hm1t and Hm2t are the first- and
second-order derivatives of the pricing function with respect to the default probability,
respectively.
According to Jarrow et al. (2011), the current price of a CDS at time s approximates
its price at time t, i.e., f m−∆ts (λ
Q
s )≈ f mt (λQs ), with m−∆t denoting the correction for the
6
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maturity time lapse. This assumption enables a connection between the future price of a
CDS contract with its current price and certain correcting terms. In particular,
f m−∆ts (λ
Q
s )≈ f mt (λQt )+(λQs −λQt )Hm1t +
1
2
(λQs −λQt )2Hm2t (2)
and, hence, investors could build a delta and gamma-neutral hedging portfolio formed by
three default swaps with different maturities, say m0, m1 and m2, such that
f m0t (λ
Q
t )+n1t f
m1
t (λ
Q
t )+n2t f
m2
t (λ
Q
t )≈ f m0−∆ts (λQs )+n1t f m1−∆ts (λQs )+n2t f m2−∆ts (λQs ),
(3)
where the portfolio weights n1t and n2t are explicitly chosen to form the market neutral
portfolio. On average, the theoretical value of portfolio (3) must equal the market price of
the portfolio, from which the following relation emerges:(
f m0t (λ
Q
t )−CDSt(m0)
)
+n1t
(
f m1t (λ
Q
t )−CDSt(m1)
)
+n2t
(
f m2t (λ
Q
t )−CDSt(m2)
)
≈ εm0t +n1tεm1t +n2tεm2t , (4)
with CDSt(mi) denoting the observed market prices, and εmit = f
mi
t (λ
Q
t )−CDSt(mi) de-
fined implicitly for i ∈ {0,1,2}.
Apart from the tracking error of the strategy, equation (4) shows that discrepancies
between the observed and theoretical prices in the CDS curve are directly informative of
arbitrage opportunities. As a result, arbitrageurs could design profitable trading strategies
involving CDS contracts with different maturities to exploit price discrepancies along the
term structure of CDS, as shown empirically in Jarrow et al. (2011). Arbitrage activity,
therefore, would align CDS prices along different maturities as to prevent arbitrage oppor-
tunities.
2.2. Market frictions and price discrepancies
In practice, the differences between observed and theoretical prices may not necessar-
ily appear as a consequence of a temporary misappraisal of the fundamental value, but
also as a consequence of market frictions. Schleifer and Vishny (1997) show that profes-
sional arbitrageurs are reluctant to trade under extreme market circumstances as the cost of
implementing arbitrage operations can be prohibitive. The main reason is that volatility in-
creases informational asymmetries and exposes arbitrageurs to unwind their positions pre-
7
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maturely, possibly incurring substantial losses. As a result, risk-averse arbitrageurs avoid
extremely volatile markets, which reduces the market effectiveness in eliminating differ-
ences between fundamental and transaction prices.2 While many well-known theoretical
asset pricing models do not acknowledge transaction costs, in practice these frictions may
have substantial effects on prices. This seems to be particularly true in OTC markets, as
these exchanges are characterized by a high degree of illiquidity, irregular trading, asym-
metric information, and greater counterparty-search costs relative to stock markets; see
Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005) and Tang and Yan (2008) for a discussion.
The possible relationship between market frictions and pricing deviations brings up
the issue of capturing these discrepancies empirically. To this end, define m1,m2, ...,mN as
an increasing sequence of maturities, and denote as CDSt(mi) and CDS∗t (mi) the observed
CDS spread for the i-th maturity and the corresponding model-implied theoretical price at
time t, respectively. Let CDSt = (CDSt(m1), ...,CDSt(mN))
′ be a (N×1) vector collecting
the observed CDS spreads representative of the CDS term structure at time t, and define
CDS∗t analogously. Then, the most natural measure of pricing discrepancy is given by the
Euclidean distance δt = ||CDSt−CDS∗t ||, i.e.,
δt =
√
N
∑
i=1
(CDSt (mi)−CDS∗t (mi))2 (5)
such that δt = 0 if and only if all the prices along the curve CDSt match with the fun-
damental values, and δt > 0 is a proper measure of pricing error otherwise. While a
number of transformations can be defined on δt , we shall consider the re-scaled distance
noiseCDS,t ≡ δt/
√
N proposed in Hu et al. (2013). This variable may also be seen as a
sample-based measure of the mean cross-sectional dispersion of the pricing error at time
t. The term noise was coined by Hu et al. (2013) since, in the fixed-income literature, it is
usual to refer to deviations from a given pricing model as noise.
Two main clarifying comments on (5) follow. In first place, Hu et al. (2013) origi-
nally proposed the noise measure for Treasury bonds under the the premise that the abun-
dance of arbitrage capital during normal times helps smooth out the Treasury yield curve
and keep the average dispersion low. In periods of stress, arbitrage capital vanishes and,
2Goldstein, Li and Yang (2013) argue that in highly segmented markets, such as the CDS market, the
existence of investors with fairly heterogeneous trading opportunities can lead to multiplicity of equilibria,
causing instability in prices.
8
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
hence, the average dispersion increases. On the basis of the corresponding noise mea-
sure, say noiseT Bond,t , these authors show that the deviations between market and model-
based yields are characteristically low –and liquidity correspondingly high– in normal
periods, but generally tend to increase during crises as arbitrage capital exits the market-
place. Therefore, the noise measure successfully captures an empirical link between price
deviations and arbitrage capital.3 As argued by Hu et al. (2013), Treasuries provide a par-
ticularly good framework to capture global illiquidity, but the information related to this
risk factor is not necessarily limited to the Treasury market. For instance, the hedge-fund
market may conceivably provide reliable estimates as well since hedge-fund returns de-
crease during periods of arbitrage capital withdraws; in fact, hedge-fund returns are used
to empirically benchmark the explanatory ability of the noise measure in Hu et al. (2013).
In our study, we implement (5) in the sovereign CDS market in the belief that the resultant
measure would not only be informative on local liquidity and market frictions, but also
reflect global trends that feature market illiquidity.
Consistent with this idea, there is an increasing literature arguing that CDS spreads are
highly sensitive to market-wide global liquidity conditions; see, for example, Tang and
Yan (2008), Bongaerts et al. (2011), and Corò et al. (2013). Net protection sellers such as
hedge funds and proprietary trading desks of investment banks are typically the marginal
liquidity providers and use the CDS market mainly for speculative purposes. Against a
backdrop of decreasing market-wide liquidity and CDS spread widening, however, pro-
tection sellers must face pronounced mark-to-market losses and the possibility of incur in
costly contract liquidations, which leads to sharp reductions in liquidity provisions. Con-
sistent with this idea, Junge and Trolle (2014) have recently shown that protection sellers
require a premium for bearing the risk associated with covariation between CDS returns
and market-wide liquidity. Therefore, capital restrictions during periods of global illiq-
uidity make price discrepancies in CDS markets more likely to occur; conversely, sizable
pricing errors may be indicative of illiquidity-related distortions that stem from the inabil-
ity or the unwillingness of market participants to engage in CDS trading rather than being
indicative of “true” arbitrage opportunities.
Furthermore, the information on global illiquidity can be tracked more efficiently in
CDS markets than it might be in other related markets, such as the corporate bond market.
3This measure has been used subsequently in a number of studies; e.g. Filipovic and Trolle (2013).
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While bonds are physical assets, CDS are OTC bilateral derivative contracts. This crucial
distinction makes CDS markets more liquid along certain dimensions, since CDS prices
are less sensitive to convenience yield effects than bond prices, and the notional amount
of CDS that can be traded is arbitrarily large; see Longstaff et al. (2011) for a deeper dis-
cussion. In fact, whereas the corporate bond market is usually more liquid for bond buyers
than it is for short-sellers (due to the need to source a physical asset to reverse repo), the
CDS market is equally liquid in both directions. This makes the CDS the preferred instru-
ment for those seeking to implement a short-credit position. More importantly, the extant
literature has shown that CDS markets tend to lead bond markets in the price discovery
process, i.e., new information tends to be impounded into CDS premia more rapidly. This
evidence has been reported for both corporate (e.g., Blanco et al. (2005); Forte and Peña,
2009) and sovereign markets (Delatte, Gex and López-Villavicencio (2012), Gyntelberg,
Hördahl, Ters and Urban (2013); and IMF, 2013). Consequently, the average dispersion
of CDS spreads should be expected to be low during normal periods, when arbitrage cap-
ital actively contributes to align CDS spreads, and high in turmoil periods, when arbitrage
capital exits the market. In that case, abnormally high values of noiseCDS,t may be related
to episodes of market-wide illiquidity and local or global shortage of arbitrage capital.
In second place, characterizing (5) requires prices generated by a theoretical term-
structure pricing model. We focus initially on the continuous-time, arbitrage-free CDS
pricing model of Pan and Singleton (2008), referred to as the PS model in the sequel. The
distinctive characteristic of this pricing model is that it yields a full theoretical term struc-
ture of CDS spreads consistent with the no-arbitrage condition that overperforms other
alternative approaches; see, for example, Longstaff et al. (2011). A priori, it seems rea-
sonable to expect that sensible choices of alternative pricing models would lead to similar
patterns in the resultant pricing errors. However, since this is ultimately an empirical is-
sue, we shall address the robustness of the main conclusions based on Pan and Singleton
(2008) by focusing on alternative term structure pricing models that differ in complexity
and underlying assumptions. This will be extensively discussed in Section 5.2.
3. Estimating the noise measure
3.1. The data
Default swaps are a well-known class of OTC derivatives traded for investing and spec-
ulating single name default risk at different maturities. The CDS market has undergone
10
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tremendous expansion over recent years, now accounting for more than two thirds of all
outstanding credit derivatives (Goldstein et al., 2013). Although sovereign CDS trading
constitutes a relatively small share of this market, its importance has grown rapidly since
the 2007-2008 financial crisis owing to increasing concerns about default in Treasuries
and bonds issued by advanced economies; see IMF (2013).4 A typical CDS contract on
sovereign debt specifies that a buyer, in exchange for an annual fee set by the market and
paid quarterly, obtains from a seller specified credit protection against default and broadly
similar credit events affecting securities issued by a reference country. The CDS spread
represents the annual percentage over the total amount of the bond (notional) paid to the
seller for obtaining protection in case of a credit event occurs. Such events include failure
to pay, repudiation or moratorium on debt, and certain debt restructurings.
The dataset analyzed in this paper consists of an unbalanced panel of weekly sovereign
CDS spreads from 16 economies of the G-20 group: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China,
France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Ko-
rea, Spain, UK and US. The choice of the weekly frequency aims to avoid potential caveats
related to the low trading activity at daily frequency of most sovereign CDS contracts.5
The sample initially available spans the period from January 1st, 2006 to November 9th,
2012 and includes 358 weekly observations for most of these countries. The data for
some countries (Saudi Arabia, UK, and US) is available on a shorter period and includes
a smaller number of observations, ranging from 228 (Saudi Arabia) to 257 (US) data. The
maturity spectrum of CDS contracts in the sample comprises all available maturities from
one to ten years. All contracts are denominated in US dollars and written under the Com-
plete Restructuring clause. Data have been provided by Credit Market Analysis (CMA), a
quote provider integrated in the Datastream platform.6
Together with CDS spreads, we observe different variables related to trading activity
4For instance, the rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the US sovereign credit rating from
AAA to AA+ in June 2011, giving rise to the first downgrade in the nation’s history. Similarly, the agency
downgraded the rating of nine Euro-zone countries in January 2012, stripping France and Austria from the
AAA rating, and relegating the sovereign debt of Portugal and Cyprus to junk status.
5Chen, Fleming, Jackson, Li and Sarkar (2011) analyze the distribution of total trading frequency of
sovereign CDS contracts across all maturities. From a total of 74 reference entities, just four are actively
traded on average 30 times daily; and 14 out of 74 are less actively traded, at 15 times per day on average.
The remaining sovereign references are infrequently traded at an average of twice daily.
6The CMA database collects daily reports on bid, ask and mid-quotes of CDS spreads from a robust
consortium that consists of approximately 40 members from the buy-side community (hedge funds, asset
managers, and major investment banks), which are active participants in the CDS market.
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and liquidity for any of the sovereign CDS included in the sample. These data are provided
by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) since November 2008. More
specifically, we observe both the gross and net notional CDS positions, and the number of
outstanding contracts in the CDS market. The gross notional value is the aggregate sum
of the CDS contracts bought or sold for a single reference entity. The net notional values
represents the aggregate net funds transference between protection sellers and buyers that
could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event relating to a particular reference
entity. Finally, the number of contracts reports the outstanding number of contracts for a
given reference. A complete description of the dataset is provided in the online Appendix
A of this article.
3.2. Theoretical CDS spreads and econometric estimation
The empirical implementation of the noise measure (5) requires model-implied theo-
retical prices. Most of the pricing models for CDS spreads in the extant literature strive
essentially to capture default risk and the potential loss upon default, similarly to that
of credit spreads for corporate bonds. The intensity framework of Duffie and Singleton
(1999) and Lando (1998) seems to be the most popular pricing framework. Under this ap-
proach, the default event is modeled as the first jump of a Poisson process with stochastic
default intensity λQt , where Q denotes the risk-neutral measure. Then, the (annualized)
price of a CDS contract for maturity m at time t obeys the relation,
1
4
CDSt(m)
4m
∑
i=1
EQt
[
exp
(
−
∫ t+ i4
t
(rs +λQs )ds
)]
=
(1−RQ)
∫ t+m
t
EQt
[
λQu exp
(
−
∫ u
t
(rs +λQs )ds
)]
du (6)
where rt and RQ denote, respectively, the risk-free interest rate and the recovery of face
value (in percentage) of the referenced bond under the risk-neutral measure; see, among
others, Longstaff et al. (2005) and Pan and Singleton (2008). The left-hand side of this
equation represents the premium on the sum of expected discounted cash-flows paid by
the protection buyer under the risk-neutral measure. This premium is the CDS spread and
is quarterly. The right-hand side accounts for the expected discounted payoff received by
the protection buyer in case of a default event. Single-name CDS contracts are written
without up-front payments, which equals both sides of expression (6).
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In this setting, Pan and Singleton (2008) propose an intensity model which presents
remarkable advantages over other affine pricing models. While the CIR process has been
extensively employed in this context as it provides closed-form formulas (e.g., Longstaff
et al., 2005), the Feller condition bounds the long-term mean of the CIR-based intensity
to the square-root of its long-term variance, a requirement frequently violated in practice.
The PS model not only overcomes this drawback, but also provides a good compromise
between model parsimony and performance in a comparison of several one-factor inten-
sity models. For these reasons, and although we stress that we shall consider alternative
modeling approaches later on, the arbitrage-free PS model is the pricing benchmark cho-
sen for characterizing empirically price discrepancies in the sovereign CDS market. We
provide a brief discussion on the implementation of this model below.
The PS model assumes that the logarithm of the risk-neutral default intensity λQt fol-
lows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck diffusion process characterized by
d lnλQt = κP
(
θP− lnλQt
)
dt +σQdWPt , (7)
where κP and θP are the long-run mean, and mean-reversion rate of the process under the
actual or historical measure P, respectively, with σQ denoting the volatility of the process
and WPt a standard Wiener process. The model also characterizes the dynamics of (7)
under the risk-neutral measure Q,
d lnλQt = κQ
(
θQ− lnλQt
)
dt +σQdWQt , (8)
and the market price of risk, say Λt , defined through the affine function ϕ0 +ϕ1 lnλQt ,
where ϕ0 and ϕ1 denote constant parameters. The process (8) ensures the positiveness of
risk-neutral default intensity. However, the expectations in CDS formula (6) are not in
closed-form, so numerical techniques as the Crank-Nicholson scheme are required.
The parameters that characterize the PS model can be estimated by maximum likeli-
hood given a number of additional assumptions. The reader is referred to the original paper
for details, but we briefly sketch the main steps involved in the estimation of this model in
the sequel. In particular, the PS procedure assumes that CDS contracts at a certain maturity
are priced with no error, whereas prices at the remaining maturities can be determined un-
der non-arbitrage conditions. These authors employ the 5-year maturity for extracting the
default discount process. This choice is arbitrary, but based on the sensible appreciation
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that the 5-year contract is the most heavily traded tenor in practice. We follow Pan and
Singleton (2008) and assume this contract is free of pricing errors.7 Then, a series of the
probability of default λQ can be obtained by solving (6) for this coefficient. This involves
non-linear numerical techniques, using the 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month USD Libor and 2-, 3-,
4-, 5-, 7- and 10-year USD interest rate swaps to construct the risk-free curve that charac-
terizes (6). The remaining CDS contract maturities are assumed to be priced with random
errors εm,t that obey a normal multivariate distribution with zero mean vector and covari-
ance matrix σ2MIN−1, where IN−1 denotes the N− 1 dimensional identity matrix and N is
the number of different maturities. For parsimony and computational tractability, we as-
sume that σM is constant across maturities, noting however that results do not qualitatively
differ from more general specifications (results under heteroskedasticity are available upon
request). The estimation of this model also requires the discretization of λQ in expression
(7), for which we adopt the Euler’s approach and set ∆t = 1/52. Then, the unknown
parameters ψ = (ψP,ψQ,σM)′, with ψP = (κP,θP)′, ψQ = (κQ,θQ,σQ,RQ)′, can be es-
timated by maximizing the conditional log-likelihood function ∑Tt=2 ln f P(εm,t |ψ,Ft−1),
withFt−1 denoting the set of available information up to t, and
f P(εm,t |ψ,Ft−1) = φP(εm,t |σM,Ft−1)×φP(lnλQt |ψP,σQ,Ft−1)
×
∣∣∣∣∣∂CDSQ(λQ|ψQ,Ft−1)∂λQt
∣∣∣∣∣
−1
(9)
where φP(·) denotes the probability density function of the Normal distribution, λQt as
given by expression (7), and CDSQ(·) in formula (6).
Table 1 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates of ψ (robust standard errors in
parenthesis) for the different sovereigns CDS in the sample. The mean-reversion speed
estimates under the actual measure, κP, are higher than the mean-reversion speed coeffi-
cients under the risk-neutral measure, κQ, indicating that the arrival of credit events last
longer under this measure. Moreover, the long-run mean estimates are also higher under
the risk-neutral measure (κQθQ > κPθP), suggesting that the arrival of events in the risk-
7As discussed by Longstaff et al. (2011), this choice is not expected to have a major effect in the es-
timations. We checked this issue in our context by conducting independent estimations assuming extreme
scenarios in which the 1- and 10-year maturities were correctly priced. The average correlation between the
resultant noise series and that employed in the article is higher than 80% in all cases.
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neutral scenario is more probable than in the actual one. In other words, a positive risk
premium related to changes in the credit environment seems to be priced in the sovereign
CDS market. Finally, the recovery rate RQ tends to be closely related to the creditwor-
thiness of the country: South Korea, South Africa, Germany, France and UK exhibit the
highest value (around 80%), in contrast to Argentina and Spain (around 3%). Overall, the
PS model yields reasonable estimates that are coherent with related studies in the extant
literature; see, for instance, Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2011).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3.3. Main results
Figure 1 shows the time series dynamics of the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles of
the PS-implied noiseCDS,t measure. To account for structural differences, we split the to-
tal sample into the groups formed by Advanced Economies (henceforth AE, including
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK, and US) and Emerging Economies
(henceforth EE, formed by the remaining countries in the sample). The cross-section
median of noiseCDS,t in both groups is characterized by a strongly non-linear, globally
mean-reverting pattern which can be associated to latent dynamics that determine whether
the economy is in a normal or stressed regime.8 Pricing errors tend to have a low disper-
sion during normal periods, but they largely increase during stress periods, peaking after
systemic episodes such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008, or the
Greek bailout in March, 2010. This evidence completely agrees with the results reported
by Hu et al. (2013). On average, pricing discrepancies tend to be greater and much more
volatile in the EE group, but it is clear that the AE- and EE-related noise measures exhibit
common patterns and follow a similar trend.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 reports standard descriptive statistics of the estimates of the noise measure
for any of the sovereign CDS analyzed. The overall mean value is 13.08 basis points,
but there is a strong heterogeneity across countries. The individual averages range from
8The non-linear, mean-reverting path of the noise series is even more evident in the analysis of
noiseT Bond,t in Hu et al. (2013) because the sample analyzed therein spans a longer period, from 1987
through 2011. Over this period, noiseT Bond,t is shown to spike prominently as a consequence of shocks
related to crises, and revert to the mean level afterwards.
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4.52 (Germany) to 85.70 basis points (Argentina). Furthermore, the volatility of noiseCDS,t
largely varies from distressed to resilient economies, showing the largest differences for
Argentina, Indonesia, Italy and Spain. In contrast, solid economies in advanced countries,
such as US or Germany, show the smallest degree of average dispersion in pricing errors.
The largest value of the noise measure in Argentina reaches 1111.39 basis points, whereas
US peaks at 17.22 basis points. Clearly, the noise measure is related to the factors that
characterize whether the CDS spread has a large mean value and high dispersion or not.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Since, as discussed previously, short-term maturities exhibit larger idiosyncratic pat-
terns, it is interesting to analyze whether CDS maturities contribute equally to price di-
vergences. The existence of a systematic mispricing of CDS contracts of a given maturity
could indicate the existence of pricing factors not captured by the model (Pan and Sin-
gleton, 2008). To address this question, we define the relative contribution of maturity
mτ to the noise measure as ωt(mτ) = |CDSt(mτ)−CDS∗t (mτ)|/δt , τ = 1, ...,10, with δt
as defined in (5), and noting that 0 ≤ ωt(mτ) ≤ 1 and ∑10τ=1ωt(mτ) = 1. Recalling that
the PS model assumes no pricing error at the 5-year maturity, it follows by construction
ωt(5) = 0, and it should be understood that the relative contributions of the remaining
maturities are conditional to this assumption.
Table 3 reports basic time-series statistics (mean, median and standard deviations) of
ωt(mτ) for each maturity and each country in the sample. This table also reports the matu-
rity for which the relative contributionωt(mτ) is the largest. According to these results, the
1-year maturity contract systematically exhibits the highest contribution to the noise mea-
sure in most countries.9 The average relative contribution of the pricing errors to the total
ranges from 26.93% in US to 59.20% in Argentina. In their study focused on the emerg-
ing economies of Mexico, South Korea and Turkey, Pan and Singleton (2008) reported
evidence of large 1-year maturity CDS mispricing, arguing that this feature is related to
limited cash vehicles with which to hedge such instruments, which erodes the ability of
arbitrageurs to engage in effective strategies. Our results agree with these findings (show-
ing large relative contributions of the 1-year CDS to the total error of about 60.15% and
9Australia, China and US seem to be rare exceptions. Even though the noise is concentrated at longer
maturities for these countries, the standard deviation of the noise contribution to the 1-year maturity is still
the highest across maturities.
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46.70% in Mexico and South Korea, respectively) and further generalize them by show-
ing that short-term mispricing tends to apply systematically in the remaining economies
included in our sample, whether emergent or not.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Before a more formal analysis is conducted, it is worth analyzing the existence of
commonalities in pricing errors through simple descriptive techniques. Being obtained
from pricing errors, no systematic pattern across countries should be observed. However,
the principal component analysis on the standardized noise series reveals the existence
of a first principal component able to explain approximately 33% of the total variation.
This share increases to 56% and 65% when the second and third components are included,
respectively. The loading coefficients on the first principal component (not reported here
but included in the online Appendix B of this article) could be interpreted as a world-wide
market trend, since all the countries except Brazil and China exhibit positive loadings. The
loadings on the second principal component exhibit a heterogeneous behavior that can be
related to creditworthiness: Loadings tend to be positive or mildly negative for countries
in which the noise measure exhibits low mean values and low volatility, such as France,
Germany, UK, and US, and are mostly negative for countries in which pricing errors have
a relatively high mean and high volatility, such as most countries in the EE group and
distressed economies in peripheral Europe, such as Spain.
The strong degree of commonality suggests the existence of risk factors which are
not properly captured by the theoretical model but which, nevertheless, are systematically
priced in the CDS market. To gain further insight into the sources of this commonality
and its economic interpretation, we project the time series increments of the first princi-
pal components, denoted as ∆PC1, on the increments of a set of market-wide global state
variables sampled from the US market over the period December 2007 to November 2012.
Using variables from the US market to proxy for global conditions in this preliminary anal-
ysis seems reasonable because of the strong degree of globalization in financial markets
and the predominance of the US economy (see, among others, Rapach, Strauss and Zhou,
2013). Nevertheless, we stress that a more rigorous analysis, building on country-specific
variables in a panel-data approach, shall be conducted in the next section. The explanatory
variables used in this preliminary analysis are the changes in the volatility index of the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (VIX), used as an indicator of global uncertainty; the
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change in Moody’s bond spread index between AAA and BBB bonds (Default), used as
a proxy for corporate default spread; the return of the Dow Jones Index (MarketReturn),
used as a natural indicator of stock market performance and market risk; the change in
the first principal component of net notional volumes (PC1netvol), and the change in the
first principal component of bid-ask spreads at 5-year maturity (PC1BA5y), both of which
are used as different proxies of aggregate market-wide liquidity. All these variables are
sampled weekly.
Table 4 reports the main statistical outcomes (estimates, Newey-West robust standard
errors and adjusted R2) from the individual regressions of ∆PC1 on a constant and any
of the state variables considered. Recall that the first principal component captures the
main source of common variation in cross-country sovereign CDS mispricing. All these
variables except increments in PC1netvol are highly significant, with adjusted R2 ranging
from a conservative 5% (∆Default) to a large 21.79% (MarketReturn). Table 4 also reports
the results from the joint regression of ∆PC1 on all the state variables. The estimates reveal
a significantly and positive association with increments in VIX, and a significantly and
negative association with market returns and increments in the first principal component
of net volume. The adjusted R2 increases up to 25.75%. The overall picture that emerges
from this analysis shows that against a backdrop of increasing volatility, large market
losses, and increasing number of offsetting operations in the sovereign CDS market (i.e.,
a characteristic scenario of financial distress), the conditional mean of the first principal
component tends to increase. This is coherent with the hypothesis that the noise measures
computed from CDS spreads are (partially) driven by systematic sources of financial risk
mainly related to excess volatility and market-wide illiquidity. Remarkably, the overall
evidence from this analysis is completely similar to that reported by Hu et al. (2013) on
the variables that drive price discrepancies as captured by the noise measure in the different
context of Treasury markets.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The main conclusions from this preliminary analysis allows us to conclude that price
discrepancies exhibit a strong time-varying pattern which increases substantially during
distress periods. Pricing errors are on average largely contributed by discrepancies at the
1-year maturity, which could be related to market frictions and trading barriers that gen-
erally pose limits to the arbitrage. More importantly, the principal component analysis
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reveals a strong source of cross-country commonality driving pricing discrepancies that
can be related to market-wide stress conditions characterized by high volatility, negative
market performance, and liquidity withdraws. This evidence shows a characteristic sce-
nario which fits squarely with the theoretical predictions in Schleifer and Vishny (1997),
showing that larger pricing errors can systematically be related to adverse economic sce-
narios. These conclusions, based on a simple and direct analysis, will be confirmed in a
more rigorous analysis based on panel-data regressions in the next section.
4. Determinants of pricing errors in sovereign CDS markets
The main objective of this paper is to examine the economic determinants of pricing er-
rors in the sovereign CDS term structure. To this end, we implement different estimation
procedures within the panel-data methodology that regress a log-transform of the noise
measure on either contemporaneous or lagged values of illiquidity-related variables. Our
main aim is to parsimoniously address the existence of an empirical relationship between
price discrepancies and market-wide illiquidity, considering mainly country-specific vari-
ables that capture local information on the liquidity conditions in the CDS market as well
as other potential global control variables.
4.1. State variables
We consider a panel of country-specific and global variables that can be grouped into
the categories of market-wide illiquidity and market uncertainty. The set of illiquidity-
related variables include i) the 5-year maturity bid-ask spreads (Bidask), ii) Number of
Traded CDS contracts (Contracts), and iii) Net Notional Outstanding Volume (Netvol).
All these variables are country-specific and are available from DTCC.
The set of of market uncertainty-related variables include iv) a local proxy of market
volatility (Marketvol), as measured by the absolute value of the weekly market index
return, and v) a global indicator of default premium (Default), characterized as the price
spread between AAA and BBB rated US investment, as discussed previously. It should
be noticed that this set of variables suffices to explain a remarkably large proportion of
variability, since price discrepancies turn out to be strongly related to country-specific
drivers which characterize liquidity. As discussed in the robustness section, taking further
macroeconomic and financial variables into account, most of which are only available at
the global level, does not seem to improve results nor lead to qualitative differences in the
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main results. We discuss the variables used in the panel-data regressions in the remainder
of this subsection.
All the variables in the liquidity group are strongly correlated and share a considerable
degree of commonality. Although they all can be related to liquidity risk, they measure
different facets of this magnitude (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyan, 2001). In partic-
ular, Bidask, the most popular indicator of illiquidity in security markets, is a measure
of the tightness of asset prices. According to the extant literature, bid-ask spreads in-
clude two components. One is the compensation required by market-makers for inventory
costs, clearing fees, and/or monopoly profits. The second one results from a characteris-
tic adverse-selection problem faced by market-makers in a context of asymmetric infor-
mation. It mainly represents the additional compensation for the expected costs caused
by informed-trading activity. Hence, in periods of greater price uncertainty in which in-
formed investors can profit from their superior information, bid-ask spreads tend to widen
and lead to greater transaction costs. Acharya and Johnson (2007) report evidence of
informed-trading activity in the CDS market. Furthermore, this information flows to eq-
uity markets in response to negative credit news, suggesting that price discovery for those
events tends to happen in CDS markets. Consequently, we expect a positive relation with
mispricing, since liquidity providers can exit the market when transaction costs are high;
see Longstaff et al. (2005), Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007), and Tang and Yan (2008).
The variable Contracts is a measure of market-wide trading activity and, therefore,
can be deemed to be an indirect measure of liquidity. In general terms, trading activity
induces price volatility, so the number of trades has been often related to noise trading.
Furthermore, Tang and Yan (2008) use this variable to proxy for the overall inventory in
the CDS market, which could also be related to holding costs. In the inter-dealer market,
inventory control may be a major concern for dealers under funding constraints, as this
may impair the capacity for dealers to take sides in additional contracts and thereby affect
the liquidity of the related contracts; see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Finally,
Oehmke and Zawadowsky (2013) argue that the illiquidity of the bond market increases
the amount of CDS outstanding, since CDS contracts should be more heavily used when
the underlying bond is illiquid – and thus hard or expensive to trade. According to all these
considerations, we should expect a positive relation with higher price discrepancies.
The variable Netvol reflects the net total amount exchanged in case of default. In con-
trast to the gross notional outstanding volume, which increases with every trade, the net
20
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
notional volume adjusts the gross notional amount for offsetting positions. In this way, the
net notional turns out to be an excellent indicator of the overall amount of credit risk trans-
fer in the CDS market. As discussed by Oehmke and Zawadowsky (2013), an intuitive
way to interpret the Netvol variable is to consider it as the maximum amount of payments
that need to be made between counterparties in the case of a credit event on a particu-
lar reference entity. As in other derivative markets, such as the futures market, entering
offsetting trades in the CDS markets is a more common way to reduce exposures than
canceling an existing CDS contract. Because arbitrageurs unwind positions during ex-
treme circumstances, effective reductions in net traded volumes should be related to larger
pricing errors. This variable could inversely proxy for the unobservable holding costs (in-
cluding, for example, the opportunity cost of capital, the opportunity cost of not receiving
full interest on short-sale proceeds, and idiosyncratic risk exposures), with arbitrageurs
closing positions when these costs increase excessively.
Together with these variables, we consider the country-specific variable Marketvol to
capture market-wide volatility in the local stock market. Market volatility is a latent factor
particularly sensitive to the information flow which subsumes information relative to col-
lective expectations, environmental conditions, and market sentiment. Consistent with the
results reported in the previous section and the theoretical considerations in Schleifer and
Vishny (1997) and others, we expect volatility to be a natural driver of the noise measure.
Accordingly, larger levels of volatility lead to greater pricing errors. Additionally, the vari-
able Default, calculated using the Moody’s bond spread index for 3-5 year maturity bonds,
is a global proxy to capture time-varying default premium; see Hu et al. (2013). Notice
that, since the noise measure is obtained from the residuals of a theoretical default-risk
model, this variable must not be significant if default risk is correctly priced on average
by the model. Hence, the analysis on this variable provides a diagnosis test about the
empirical performance of the PS model.
4.2. Analysis of determinants and short-term predictive power
Let lnnoiseCDS,it denote the natural logarithm of the sample estimate of the noiseCDS
measure for the i-th country at time t. We model the conditional mean of this process as a
linear function of the state variables building on a panel-data model specification. Acharya
and Johnson (2007) and Tang and Yan (2008) use a similar approach to identify the main
determinants of CDS spreads, rather than CDS spread pricing errors; see also Chiaramonte
and Casu (2013). The specification is similar in spirit to the determinant models used, for
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instance, in Peña et al. (1999) and Deuskar et al. (2008), although our approach builds
on direct estimates of pricing errors. In particular, we consider the following regression
specification, referred to as Model I in the sequel,
lnnoiseCDS,it = α+φ lnBidaskit +β1 lnContractsit +β2 lnNetvolit
+ β3Marketvolatilityit +β4De f aultt +ηi + εit (10)
or, using a more convenient notation,
lnnoiseCDS,it = α+φ lnBidaskit +β ′Xit +ηi + εit , (11)
where ηi represents country-specific effects that are constant over time but can vary across
countries, θ = (α,φ ,β ′)′ , with β = (β1, ...,β4)′ , denotes the vector of unknown param-
eters, εit is a disturbance assumed to obey standard assumptions, and Xit is a vector of
explanatory variables defined implicitly.
Some brief comments follow. While bid-ask spreads are stationary series, the vector
Xit includes strongly-persistent variables which may be driven by stochastic or determin-
istic trends, such as lnContracts, lnNetvol, Marketvolatility and Default. In order to en-
sure that this feature does not impose any meaningful distortion in the main conclusions
from (11) , we will consider an alternative specification that builds on first differences of
these variables. The log-transform is applied to reduce the effects of outliers and het-
eroskedasticity in the series. Note that, as a result, the coefficients associated to regressors
in logarithms can be interpreted as the elasticity of noiseCDS,it with respect to the related
variable. Finally, this specification does not include gross volume, initially available in
DTCC, because this variable has a correlation coefficient of 85% with Contracts. We ex-
clude that variable to avoid colinearity-related concerns, noting that Contracts shows a
greater sample correlation to the dependent variable (36%), yet a smaller correlation to the
other explanatory variables than gross contracts does.
Since Xit is a strongly persistent vector process with high first-order autocorrelation
coefficients, for the sake of robustness, we consider an alternative specification to (11) in
which persistent variables are plugged in differences, namely,
lnnoiseCDS,it = α∗+φ∗ lnBidaskit +β ∗′∆Xt +ηi +uit (12)
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with ∆Xit = Xit −Xit−1. Since bid-ask spreads and the dependent variable are stationary,
they are left in levels. The resultant model shall be referred to as Model II in the sequel.
The parameters that characterize equations (11) and (12) are initially estimated us-
ing three different procedures aiming to control for cluster errors, unobservable individual
heterogeneity, and endogeneity. In particular, we first consider pooled time-series cross-
sectional regressions with two-way cluster-robust standard errors accounting for country
and week clusters. This methodology allows us to carry out statistical inference which
is robust to fairly general simultaneous dependencies of unknown form in both the cross-
sectional and time-series dimensions of the panel; see Petersen (2009). Furthermore, this
methodology seems particularly useful in the empirical context of this paper, character-
ized by a panel with a larger number of time-series observations than individuals. We
can readily control for unobservable heterogeneity using individual dummies to estimate
the coefficients ηi, since the Haussman test largely favors fixed-effect over random errors.
Second, consistent with model specification testing, and as is common in the related litera-
ture, we consider fixed-effects panel-data regressions with robust errors to autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.10 The resultant estimates are remarkably similar to those obtained
under the first approach. Lastly, we consider IV estimation in the fixed-effects panel data,
using a single lag of the variables as an instrument in order to mitigate concerns related to
endogeneity. The results from a more sophisticated analysis, based on GMM estimation
and building on multiple instruments, shall be discussed later in the robustness analysis
section.
In addition, we analyze the predictive ability of the variables in Model I and II to fore-
cast the dependent variable. To this end, we regress lnnoiseCDS,it on lagged values of all the
right-hand side variables in equations (11) and (12), i.e., we consider predictive panel-data
regressions to appraise whether the state variables are useful to predict price discrepancies
given the set of available information. Consequently, and paralleling equations (11) and
(12), we consider the predictive equations:
lnnoiseCDS,it = αl +φl lnBidaskit−1 +β ′l Xit−1 +ηi + vit (13)
10Panel data with random errors can be seen as a more general specification than fixed errors. We im-
plemented both approaches, noticing no qualitative difference in the main conclusions discussed below.
However, since the Haussman test largely favors fixed-effect over random errors in our sample, we report
and discuss the resultant estimates from this model.
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and
lnnoiseCDS,it = α∗l +φ
∗
l lnBidaskit−1 +β
∗′
l ∆Xt−1 +ηi +wit (14)
with θl =
(
αl,φl,β ′l
)′ and θ ∗l = (α∗l ,φ∗l ,β ∗′l )′ denoting the main parameters of interest,
and vit and wit being random disturbances. Because (13) and (14) are trivial variations of
Models I and II, respectively, we shall simply refer to this approach as predictive two-way
cluster when reporting the main results. All model estimations are carried out using a noise
measure estimated for the period November 4th, 2008 to November 9th, 2012, due to the
data availability restrictions on the set of explanatory variables used in the analysis.11
4.3. Main results
Table 5 reports the main outcomes from the regression analysis (estimated parameters,
robust p-values of the t-statistic for individual significance, and R2), using the different
estimation techniques discussed previously and the model specifications (11) to (14). For
ease of exposition, we shall present and discuss the parameter estimates from the two-way
cluster methodology with country dummies and robust standard errors to unknown het-
eroskedasticity and correlation. Let us first discuss the results for Model I and its predictive
variation, corresponding to equation (11) and (13) , respectively. These are reported in the
bottom part of the table (Panel A). Independently of the estimation technique, the results
show that larger bid-ask spreads, greater trading activity, and greater netting activity within
counterparties are systematically related to greater pricing errors. A relative increment of
100 basis points in the bid-ask spread leads, on average, to an increment of nearly 50 basis
points in the dispersion of pricing error, everything else being equal. Similarly, the noise
measure has a elasticity coefficient of 0.58 and −0.32 with respect to the number of con-
tracts and net notional CDS positions, respectively. These estimates are both statistically
and economically significant, and confirm a unmitigated influence of liquidity-related fac-
tors on pricing errors in the CDS markets. Owing to the importance of this result, we shall
discuss its implications in detail later on, after presenting the remaining estimates.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
As expected, the proxy for local market volatility in stock markets, used mainly as
control in our analysis, is positively related to CDS price discrepancies. The statistical
11We have also constructed two subsamples using the entire CDS dataset and the reduced one for estimat-
ing the noise measure. The results do not differ in any case.
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significance of the related coefficients is marginal in contemporaneous regressions, and
non-significant in the predictive model. While using a robust, but noisy proxy of the unob-
servable volatility based on absolute-valued weekly returns is likely to increase standard
errors, the apparent lack of significance of this variable is actually related to the (positive)
correlation that volatility shows with the Bidask variable. If the latter is omitted from the
regression analysis (results not presented for the sake of saving space), then the coefficient
on Marketvolatility is positive and strongly significant in all cases, suggesting the Bidask
partially overrides the information conveyed by volatility. Similarly, the significance tests
of Default cannot be rejected in most cases at the usual significance levels. The potential
information conveyed by the global variable Default may be subsumed in the remaining
variables as well, but it is fair to attribute the lack of significance of this variable to a cor-
rect performance of the PS model, this result evidencing that the time- and cross-section
variation of the PS-based noise measure is not driven by poor CDS-spread curve fitting.
The analysis on the predictive regression shows that illiquidity-related variables can be
used as reliable short-term predictors of future mispricing. IV-based estimation leads to
an entirely similar picture; see also GMM-based results reported in the robustness section.
Finally, the analysis of the R2 shows that the models are extremely parsimonious, since
a reduced number of country-specific variables, mainly related to market-wide illiquidity,
are able to achieve a R2 of approximately 95% in explaining price discrepancies.
The main results from the estimation of Model II are reported in the bottom part of
Table 5, see Panel B. Recall that the only difference with respect to the previous models is
that the dependent variable is regressed on Bidaskit and ∆Xit in the contemporaneous re-
gression, and on Bidaskit−1 and ∆Xit−1 in the predictive regression. The resultant estimates
show that relative increments in bid-ask spreads can be consistently related to larger price
dispersion in the CDS curve. When bid-ask spreads widen, arbitrage becomes more costly,
likely reducing arbitrage activity. As we shall see discuss later in Section 5 throughout the
different robustness checks, this is one of the most robust findings of the paper. Similarly,
changes in net notional CDS volumes are negatively related to price dispersion, indicating
further illiquidity-related distortions, as discussed previously. In this case, statistical evi-
dence supporting the inclusion of this variable is marginally significant in two-way cluster
estimation, but strongly significant through the remaining estimation procedures, particu-
larly, under IV estimation. This ambiguous evidence merits further attention and shall be
explored in greater detail in the robustness section. The variables Contracts and Default
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do not seem to play any meaningful role after accounting for other factors, and once more
market volatility is positively but not significantly related to the noise measure. As in
Panel A, this evidence is robust to different estimation techniques and remains valid even
when considering lagged values of these state variables in a predictive regression.
In summary, the price discrepancies of observed CDS spreads with respect to the PS-
implied theoretical prices do significantly covariate with state variables that characterize
illiquidity in the sovereign CDS market. This relation is so strong that illiquidity-related
variables can be used as reliable predictors of mispricing in the short-term. The evidence
is particularly significant for bid-ask spreads, as generally expected from the theoretical
and empirical considerations in the extant literature. In addition, our analysis reveals that
outstanding net volumes, a variable at our disposal which has not been used in previous
literature, can also exhibit significant explanatory and predictive power on pricing errors.
Reductions in net volume can be interpreted as increments of offsetting transactions, which
is consistent with a greater number of market participants unwinding positions during
periods of distress. The evidence of greater pricing errors in a context of shrinking liquidity
is consistent with the theoretical claims in Schleifer and Vishny (1997), since larger price
discrepancies can be caused by the temporary exit of market participants. The evidence
also agrees with the discussion of Mitchell and Pulvino (2012), who argue that CDS-bond
basis distortions during the financial crisis were caused by the trades of investment banks
which, being forced to raise cash, massively sold bond positions and unwound related
CDS contracts.
The evidence presented in this paper also provides empirical support to the central idea
embedded in Hu et al. (2013), namely, that pricing errors are informative of illiquidity
conditions. While Treasuries likely provide a more appropriate benchmark to capture
illiquidity, the previous results suggest that sovereign CDS prices are partially driven by
liquidity-related risk factors. Finally, it should be also noted that the overall evidence
reported in this section strongly suggests that single-factor intensity models, specifically
intended to capture default risk, may systematically lead to large pricing errors in a distress
scenario characterized by high illiquidity risk, as these neglect the influence of this risk-
factor. As in the case of the Black-Scholes option pricing model discussed in Peña et al.
(1999), extensions of this models that do not accommodate liquidity risk may lead to
substantial pricing errors.
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5. Robustness checks
This section shows the results from various robustness checks grouped into two main
categories that are presented in the next subsections. In Section 5.1, we discuss the general
suitability of the model specifications and its estimation when taking into account various
considerations. We first analyze if the overall evidence can be extended to both AE and EE,
or if there are heterogeneous patterns attending to creditworthiness-related considerations.
We also discuss if the estimated models could be improved significantly by adding further
variables, or if the results are robust to alternative definitions of the main proxy variables
involved in the analysis. Finally, we estimate Model II using multiple instrumentalization
through different GMM techniques. In Section 5.2, we analyze whether using alternative
pricing models could lead to substantial changes in the main qualitative results discussed
previously.
The main conclusion from all this analysis is that the overall evidence discussed pre-
viously is robust to all these considerations. For conciseness, we display the results cor-
responding to Model II, in which the dependent variable is regressed on Bidask and ∆Xit .
The main qualitative conclusions are fairly similar for Model I, but we report the results
for a specification that tends to yield more conservative results. All results are available
upon request.
5.1. Model specification and econometric estimation
A) Differences between advanced and emerging economies
Paralleling the analysis in section 4.2, Table 6 reports the main outcomes from the
panel-data analysis on the subsamples of Emerging Economies (Panel A) and Advanced
Economies (Panel B). Before the financial crisis, the global sovereign CDS market was
largely focused on emerging countries, characterized by weaker economies and higher
default probabilities. Nevertheless, trading activity on CDS contracts on debt obligations
from advanced economies, particularly from European countries, increased markedly from
the end of 2009. The main aim of this analysis is to determine whether the conclusions
discussed previously apply uniformly on both sets of countries.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The main results show that the bid-ask spread is always positive and strongly signifi-
cant, independently of the estimation technique, in both groups of countries Hence, local
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transactions costs and market frictions, captured by bid-ask spreads, prevent arbitrageurs
from forcing immediate price convergence and drive pricing errors in both AE and EE
areas. The control variable Default tends to be marginally significant in the EE group, but
not in the AE group, suggesting that it is more difficult for the PS model to accurately
capture credit-default driven dynamics in the former. Changes in the number of contracts
and Marketvolatility are not significant in any group. Finally, the coefficient associated to
changes in net volume is negative and remains highly significant, but only in the AE area
(see Panel B).
In our view, this result shows important differences in CDS pricing between AE- and
EE-related contracts that may be consistent with the fragmentation hypothesis in Goldstein
et al. (2013) and/or the existence of clienteles. Fragmentation states that different traders
may have heterogeneous motives (e.g., speculative or hedging) when trading in the same
market and, therefore, may respond to market shocks in different and even opposite direc-
tions. Indeed, sovereign CDS are used essentially for either hedging or speculative pur-
poses. The demand for credit protection is stronger for EE-issued debt because investors,
such as large banks and mutual funds, use intensively CDS to hedge long positions in low-
rated bonds; see Austin and Miller (2011). On the other hand, professional arbitrageurs
and speculators prefer to trade with investment-grade or higher-rated CDS to, for instance,
engage in CDS-bond basis strategies; see Austin and Miller (2011), Kim, Li and Zhang
(2014) and references therein.12 The evidence that relative changes in net volume is not
significant on the EE group seems to be consistent with the fact that trading activity in
this market segment is mainly intended for hedging purposes. Conversely, the evidence
that relates significantly greater pricing errors in AE with reductions in net volume may be
related to a more intense activity of arbitrageurs and speculators in this part of the market.
In order to gain further insight on the role played by the creditworthiness, we also
split the total sample according to the investment- and speculative-grade status of the un-
derlying bonds (we kindly appreciate this suggestion made by a referee). The sample is
composed mainly by countries with investment-grade bonds, and only Argentina and In-
donesia have speculative-grade bonds. Hence, excluding these countries from this sample
does not lead to major differences with respect to the total sample. Finally, we also consid-
ered two subsamples formed by AAA to A and BBB to B rated sovereigns in an extension
12Among other reasons, holding speculative-grade or lower-rated sovereign debt increases the amount of
risk-weighted assets held by the proprietary trading desks of investment banks; see Austin and Miller (2011).
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of this analysis, the first group being formed by Australia, China, France, Germany, Japan,
Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UK and US, the other, by the remaining countries. The re-
sults from this analysis are completely similar to those reported previously, and they are
provided in the online Appendix C of the article.
B) Explanatory variables.
Together with the set of variables discussed previously, we included a number of addi-
tional explanatory variables in the regression analysis. Most of these variables are global,
i.e., variables that are common for all the countries, and that reflect major trends in the
global economy. These variables involve i) the 1-day LIBOR, since this represents the
unsecured rate at which banks lend to each other and hence captures borrowing costs; ii)
the slope of the US term structure of interest rates, calculated as the difference between
the 10- and 2- year constant maturity Treasury bond yields; iii) the noise measure of Hu
et al. (2013), as a proxy of global illiquidity; iv) the local stock market index returns,
as a measure of short-term market performance; v) the spread between the three-month
LIBOR rate and the Overnight Index Swap rates, as a proxy of counterparty risk, since
this variable captures the market expectations of future official interest rates set by central
banks, and aggregates the perceptions of counterparty risk in credit markets. There exists
a strong degree of correlation between these variables. Not surprisingly, therefore, in the
estimation of Model I and II extended with these variables, most of the related coefficients
were not significant, which suggests that a simpler model that mainly exploits local in-
formation is parsimonious enough and subsumes all the relevant information to explain
systematic trends in CDS mispricing. The main results, underlining the crucial role played
by illiquidity-related variables on price biases, mainly, bid-ask spread, remain unaltered.
Finally, whereas certain explanatory variables were significant in Model I, they turned out
to be not significant in Model II (e.g., Contracts) suggesting that their incremental ex-
planatory power is overriden by the other variables after removing the long-term trend.
We estimated Model II without those variables noting no qualitative change in the main
conclusions.
C) Financial distress-related deterministic indicators.
We included time dummies signaling the occurrence of major sovereign events in the
sample, such as the Greek and Ireland bailouts, and the downgrade of Portugal. The main
aim is to isolate the estimates of the main parameters from the influence of these events. To
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this end, we considered an extended model with dummies in the unconditional mean and
cross-effects with all the local variables in our model. The main qualitative results from the
analysis do not differ substantially from those discussed previously, suggesting that bid-
ask spreads and net volumes are major drivers and even predictors of the noise measure
in the sample. Interestingly in this analysis, some variables such as trading activity and
default seem to gain statistical significance, with the crossing-effects being particularly
significant for the bid-ask spreads, net volumes and default in nearly all model specifica-
tions. As a further check, we repeated this exercise by extending the time window effect
of the dummies until one, two, three and four weeks after the event, noting that the main
qualitative conclusions are essentially the same as those reported previously.
D) Definitions of proxy variables.
We also analyzed the sensitivity of the results to the way in which the main proxy
variables have been defined. In particular, the bid-ask is defined as the 5-year maturity
bid-ask. This particular choice was motivated by a criterion of homogeneity, since the
trading-related variables facilitated by DTCC mainly refer to this maturity. Nevertheless,
since bid-ask spreads are available at different maturities, we analyzed the sensitivity of the
results to this consideration, considering bid-ask spreads at any of the available maturities,
and even the sample average of all of them. Additionally, we consider a different proxy for
market-wide volatility in the stock market, using a measure of realized volatility defined
as the sum of absolute-valued daily returns over a week. As a further alternative, we also
considered the global VIX index (VIX) instead of the local volatility proxy. Finally, we
measure Default alternatively, say Default2, as the spread between the High-yield and
Investment-grade CDX indexes with 5-year maturity. This may turn into a more accurate
measure of the time-varying dynamics of the default-risk premium. Note, furthermore,
that either VIX or Default2 can control for time-varying dynamics in risk preferences,
thereby ensuring that the main results from our analysis are not driven by considerations
related to “reaching for yield” or general appetite for risk. Episodes of increasing appetite
for risky assets could be gauged by low levels of VIX as well as by the low market risk-
premia as measured by Default2.13 The evidence discussed previously is not affected in
any significant way by any of these considerations.
13We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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E) Further estimation techniques: GMM estimation
The different specifications discussed previously were characterized using different
panel-data estimation techniques. The main purpose was to obtain results robust against
different econometric considerations. To deal with potential endogeneity biases, we adopted
a simple IV estimation procedure in the panel-data setting using a single lag of the explana-
tory variables as an instrument. This choice was mainly motivated by methodological
convenience. Nevertheless, it seems clear that further lags of the explanatory variables
may also constitute valid instruments which may enhance parameter estimation efficiency
when used simultaneously. In this subsection, we consider two different approaches that
rely on multiple instruments in order to check the robustness of the results discussed in
the main section. In particular, we consider different panel data estimation strategies
with fixed effects. These procedures not only provide estimates that are robust against
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, but also against endogeneity by efficiently exploit-
ing the information conveyed by multiple instruments. When using instrumentalization,
we noted collinearity-type problems arising from the simultaneous use of Netvolume and
Contracts in Model II.14 We, therefore, omitted Contracts in this analysis, since in Model
II this variable tends to add little or no explanatory power in relation to Netvolume, as
discussed previously, yet it can nevertheless generate statistical distortions under instru-
mentalization.
In the implementation of panel-data GMM estimation, we first used first-differentiation
to remove fixed effects, as in the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, and two to four lags
of all the explanatory variables as instruments, noting that the J-statistic of Hansen’s test
cannot reject the overall validity of the moment restrictions implied in this specification.
Table 7, Panel A, shows the main statistics (estimates, t-statistics, related p-values, and
Hansen’s J-statistic) from the GMM estimation of Model II on the total sample and the two
AE and EE subsamples. The overall picture that emerges from this analysis is completely
similar to that based on the remaining estimation procedures. Bid-ask spread appears
clearly as a main determinant of pricing errors, independently of the economic region
14Under the multiple-instrument IV panel data estimation considering the total sample, the estimated
coefficients related to Netvolume and Contracts in Model II did not appear to be individually significant
but, paradoxically, a standard test for the suitability of the exclusion of both variables from the model led
to a strong rejection. This is a clear symptom of collinearity problems between these variables. This is not
surprising since it is well-known that multicollinearity problems are exacerbated when using Instrumental
Variables; see, among others, Wooldridge (2002).
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considered. The variable Netvol always has negative coefficients associated and is strongly
significant in both the total sample and the subsample of AE countries, but turns out to be
non-significant in the EE subsample.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is distinctively intended for micropanels char-
acterized by a large number of individuals and few time-series observations. In sharp
contrast, the panel analyzed in this paper is featured by a moderate number of individu-
als (16 countries) and a relatively large number of time-series observations (209 weeks).
In this context, the large p-value exhibited by the overidentification test may be due to
an excessive number of orthogonality conditions given that these grow on the time-series
length of the panel and the number of lags used as instruments.15 This casts logical doubts
about the effectiveness of the GMM approach in the context of this paper. To overcome
this potential caveat, we additionally implemented a multiple-instrument IV estimator for
panel-data with fixed effects in the spirit of the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator. This
keeps the total number of orthogonality conditions contained independently of the time-
series dimension. As a result, the number of orthogonality conditions equals the number
of lags used to instrumentalize the endogenous variables and, consequently, the theory
that formally supports the estimator allows for large-sample panels in both the individ-
ual and time-series dimensions. As in the Arellano-Bond approach, we implemented this
procedure considering two to four lags of the explanatory variables. The main regression
outcomes (estimates, t-statistics, related p-values, and Hansen’s J-statistic) are presented
in Table 7, Panel B. The choice of the number of instruments is formally supported by
the overidentification test, with the main results leading to the same basic conclusion dis-
cussed previously: While bid-ask spreads appear consistently as a driver of pricing errors,
independently of the economic area analyzed, net volumes seem to be mainly related to
advanced economies.
5.2. Alternative pricing models
The main results discussed in the previous sections build on the PS pricing model. In
order to ensure that the overall discussion is not driven by this particular choice, and since
15Alternative procedures to the Arellano-Bond estimator, such as the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) estimator, would make this problem even worse as they rely on further orthogonality
conditions.
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a definitive functional form of the default process λQ remains an open question in the
literature, we consider two alternative pricing models, namely, a quadratic intensity func-
tion (QIF) suggested by Houweling and Vorst (2005), and the semi-parametric (NS) model
suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987). Like PS, these alternative approaches rely on CDS
spreads to directly measure the credit risk attributable to default risk and do not explicitly
accommodate other risk factors, such as liquidity risk. The main methodological dif-
ference, however, is that the theoretical term-structure is characterized on cross-sectional
estimates at a particular date, whereas PS uses maximum-likelihood in the time-series con-
text. The advantage is that QIF and NS build on flexible semi-parametric specifications
that do not impose distributional assumptions on the data. This feature allows us to ensure
that the main qualitative conclusions are not driven by the assumptions implied in Pan and
Singleton (2008).
The QIF approach builds on a second-order degree polynomial to model the term-
structure of the risk-neutral default intensity at maturity mτ at any time t, namely,
λQt (mτ) = lt + stmτ + ctm2τ , (15)
where the parameters lt , st and ct capture the level, slope and curvature of the default
term structure, respectively, with mτ denoting the time to maturity, and τ = 1, ...,10 in
our sample. Houweling and Vorst (2005) argue that this approach works reasonably in
practice. The main advantage of this specification lies on its methodological tractability,
but some readers may deem it as excessively simplistic.
The NS approach is a more sophisticated pricing model that attempts to capture the
default spread term structure at time t by parsimoniously fitting a smooth curve to the
cross-sectional data, namely,
λQt (mτ) = ξ1t +ξ2t
1− e−γtmτ
γtmτ
+ξ3t
1− e−γtmτ
γtmτ
− exp(−γtmτ) , (16)
where the parameters (ξ1t ,ξ2t ,γt)′ are latent dynamic factors that admit a precise economic
interpretation. In particular, ξ1t can be viewed as the long-term mean of the default inten-
sity; ξ2t is related to the slope of the spread term-structure, since −ξ2t = λQt (∞)−λQt (0);
ξ3t is closely related to the curvature of the shape. Finally, γt is related to the convex-
ity of the curve and controls the position, magnitude and direction of the hump of the
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spread curve. Remarkably, the NS approach provides the corresponding default rate for
a continuous of maturities, so additional interpolation is not necessary. Moreover, this
modeling approach avoids the over-parametrization, allowing for monotonically increas-
ing or decreasing and hump shaped default term curves. Jankowitsch, Pullirsch and Veza
(2008) set an extensive comparison of the pricing properties in the bond market for sev-
eral parametrizations of the default intensity, concluding that the Nelson and Siegel (1987)
specification turned out to be optimal.
Recalling that the (annualized) price of a CDS contract for maturity m at time t obeys
(6) , we can use the following discretized version of this formula for computing the spreads
under both the QIF and NS approaches,
1
4
4m
∑
j=1
e−
j
4
(
rt+λQt ( j)
)
CDSt(m) = (1−RQ)
4m
∑
j=1
e−
j
4 rt
[
e−
( j−1)
4 λ
Q
t ( j)− e− j4λQt ( j)
]
, (17)
where λQt ( j) denotes the risk-neutral default intensity at maturity j, andRQ is the recovery
rate. Consistent with previous literature, we set the risk-neutral recovery rate to 40%. We
also assume a constant default intensity λQt , which results in CDS∗t (mτ) ≈ λQt (mτ)(1−
RQ). The parameters (lt ,st ,ct)′ and (ξ1t ,ξ2t ,ξ3t ,γt)′ that characterize the QIF and NS
models are estimated using linear and non-linear least squares, respectively, given the
observable curve CDSt ; see, for instance, Houweling and Vorst (2005). Since γt in the
NS model should be positive in order to assure convergence to the long-term value ξ1t , we
impose the constraints ξ1t > 0, ξ1t +ξ2t > 0 and γt > 0 in the numerical optimization of the
objective loss-function of this model. Given the resultant estimates, it is straightforward
to compute theoretical term-structure CDS prices and, hence, determine the noise measure
with respect to the observed prices CDSt .
Figure 2 shows the time series of the cross-country median of the theoretical CDS
spreads implied by the three different pricing models considered in this paper. For com-
parative purposes, the figure also reports the qq-plots of these series in logarithms. Clearly,
all these model-implied CDS spreads tend to exhibit similar time series features on aver-
age. The pairwise correlation between the model-implied prices from PS and those from
QIF and NS are about 76% and 74%, respectively. Similarly, the correlation between the
theoretical prices generated with the QIF and NS models is nearly 80%. Note that the CDS
spreads implied by PS and NS have a similar level and tend to overlap, but the latter dis-
play a considerably degree of additional volatility. Theoretical prices from the QIF model
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exhibit similar time series properties as the other two methodologies, but the average is
downward shifted, i.e., prices are systematically smaller.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 8 reports the main results from the analysis of determinants of the QIF- and NS-
based noise measures. For ease of exposition, we report the estimates of Table 8 noting
that the dependent variable lnnoiseCDS,it is now computed according to the residuals of
either the QIF or the NS models. Not surprisingly in view of the strong correlation be-
tween the theoretical prices generated by these pricing methodologies, the overall picture
that emerges is fully consistent with the main qualitative evidence discussed in Section
4.2.16 The main conclusion from this analysis, therefore, is that the overall evidence that
pricing errors from default single-factor models can be consistently related to market-wide
illiquidity variables is not driven by the particular choice of the theoretical pricing model
and holds generally when using different approaches.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
6. Concluding remarks
The term structure of fixed-income derivative products must be consistently priced
across maturities under the absence of arbitrage opportunities. In practice, however, tem-
porary discrepancies between observed prices and theoretical values can arise as a con-
sequence of market frictions and, more generally, market illiquidity. While the extant
literature has documented both theoretically and empirically the unmitigated influence of
illiquidity-related costs on arbitrage-free option pricing models, the evidence for other
derivative markets is generally scarce, and plainly nonexistent for CDS. The main objec-
tive of this paper has been to contribute to this literature by documenting the existence of
systematic illiquidity-related patterns in the pricing errors implied by some of the most
popular pricing models used to value CDS spreads. To this end, we have implemented dif-
ferent panel-data estimation techniques on a broad sample of sovereign CDS in 16 coun-
tries.
16The only meaningful difference in the qualitative conclusions refers to the significance of the control
variable Default, which is positive and statistically significant under the QIF model. This means that such
model may not succeed in capturing the embedded default risk in CDS spreads.
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The main evidence in this paper is remarkably robust and suggests that price discrepan-
cies in CDS markets can systematically be related to illiquidity factors. Pricing errors tend
to be greater during periods of significant distress, such as the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers or the European debt crisis, as expected under the general arbitrage capital hypothesis.
Bid-ask spread is identified in the panel-data analysis as a key economic determinant, and
even as a reliable short-term predictor, of price divergences. Increasing offsetting transac-
tions can also be related to large pricing errors both in determinant and predictive regres-
sions, particularly, in the group of advanced economies. The overall evidence presented
and discussed in this paper is largely consistent with the hypothesis that arbitrage capital
is affected by market conditions and exits the market during times of distress, causing as-
sets to be traded at prices significantly different to their fundamental value. Accordingly,
theoretical pricing models that fail to properly accommodate the additional compensation
required for market maker risks can systematically lead to pricing errors in this context.
This evidence is important for different agents, including investors who trade in the
sovereign CDS market and supervisory organisms that use sovereign CDS transaction
prices as reliable indicators of the underlying economic conditions. On the one hand,
most investors trade in CDS markets for either speculative or hedging purposes. For both
types of agents, the evidence that state-of-the-art CDS pricing models can generate prices
that systematically depart from real prices is particularly relevant for its economic impli-
cations. Investment decisions based on the theoretical prices generated by these models
may lead to suboptimal results in a distress scenario. On the other hand, regulators and
supervisory organisms often closely monitor financial and economic time series looking
for signals that may anticipate a financial weakening. The sovereign CDS market provides
natural indicators for this end, since CDS spreads convey information on market expec-
tations of creditworthiness. However, if sovereign CDS spreads are wrongly assumed to
solely reflect default risk, the severity of the underlying market conditions could be largely
overestimated, particularly, during periods of distress. In this context, transaction prices
may no longer reflect fundamental values, but also include large illiquidity-risk premiums,
as directly suggested by the recent literature on the field, and confirmed from the empir-
ical findings in this paper. The case of peripheral European countries in the midst of the
European sovereign crisis perhaps illustrates this point accurately, since sovereign CDS
contracts were traded at excessively high prices to solely reflect credit default risk premia.
The results from this paper are drawn from an empirical analysis focused exclusively
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on sovereign CDS data, which poses logical limitations to the generality of main conclu-
sions involved. An interesting topic for further research, consequently, is the extension of
this analysis to the corporate segment of the derivative credit market. The motivation for
analyzing illiquidity-related frictions is much more prevalent in the corporate CDS market
given the difficulties to short-sell illiquid bonds and the associate effects on CDS-bond
basis and arbitrage. Furthermore, such a study would be of interest because it would allow
to address additional questions more precisely and which cannot be explored in our study
owing to limitations in the dataset. In this regard, it seems of particular interest to formally
characterize clientele-type effects related to investment-grade and high-yield segments of
the corporate market using more detailed information. The evidence reported in the cur-
rent paper provides clear insight on the relations that should be expected, but a formal
analysis on this question constitutes an interesting topic for future research.
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Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates
Country κQ κQθQ σ κP κPθP σG RQ LogLk
Argentina 0.0977 -0.3111 1.1515 0.4100 -1.3947 0.0158 0.0100 10055.49
(0.0109) (0.0345) (0.0054) (0.4271) (1.4933) (0.0000) (0.0032)
Australia -0.1576 0.5665 0.8519 2.0488 -9.7753 0.0006 0.6568 14361.35
(0.0055) (0.0253) (0.0086) (1.0181) (4.9049) (0.0000) (0.0246)
Brazil -0.0372 0.3160 0.9967 1.4271 -6.0946 0.0015 0.7120 18082.42
(0.0046) (0.0235) (0.0058) (0.5463) (2.2478) (0.0000) (0.0065)
China -0.0725 0.2836 1.0452 0.6028 -3.2016 0.0010 0.6741 19873.02
(0.0051) (0.0270) (0.0048) (0.5508) (2.7026) (0.0000) (0.0124)
France -0.3077 1.2479 0.7489 0.7476 -3.9226 0.0008 0.7792 20549.94
(0.0044) (0.0180) (0.0026) (0.2650) (1.4954) (0.0000) (0.0050)
Germany -0.3294 1.4366 0.7977 0.3122 -1.8284 0.0006 0.7966 21590.77
(0.0049) (0.0226) (0.0046) (0.4622) (2.6673) (0.0000) (0.0075)
Indonesia 0.0262 -0.0780 1.0802 0.8218 -3.6363 0.0026 0.3690 16292.05
(0.0029) (0.0152) (0.0064) (0.5350) (2.2836) (0.0000) (0.0129)
Italy -0.1439 0.4858 0.8729 0.0935 -0.3948 0.0016 0.7069 18222.76
(0.0065) (0.0231) (0.0044) (0.3268) (1.2389) (0.0000) (0.0049)
Japan -0.2444 1.0591 1.0024 0.6477 -3.9007 0.0008 0.4715 20608.46
(0.0037) (0.0181) (0.0060) (0.5088) (3.3369) (0.0000) (0.0139)
Mexico -0.0637 0.3664 0.9337 0.1722 -0.8381 0.0009 0.7454 19782.02
(0.0031) (0.0140) (0.0050) (0.3099) (1.2314) (0.0000) (0.0030)
Saudi Arabia -0.1952 0.6712 0.6739 0.9137 -3.8040 0.0007 0.5927 13230.57
(0.0027) (0.0093) (0.0068) (1.0620) (4.2584) (0.0000) (0.0124)
South Africa 0.2871 -1.2749 1.9191 0.5267 -2.9677 0.0012 0.7046 18922.40
(0.0061) (0.0393) (0.0076) (0.5213) (2.6152) (0.0000) (0.0061)
South Korea -0.0087 0.1557 0.8793 0.3607 -1.6318 0.0011 0.8246 19178.13
(0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0019) (0.2136) (0.7573) (0.0000) (0.0015)
Spain -0.0720 0.0833 0.8929 0.1361 -0.8052 0.0014 0.0335 18550.07
(0.0018) (0.0063) (0.0039) (0.1944) (1.1928) (0.0000) (0.0066)
UK 0.2227 -1.2409 1.7872 0.4324 -2.8469 0.0008 0.7695 14987.91
(0.0236) (0.1769) (0.0105) (0.8604) (4.8489) (0.0000) (0.0350)
US 0.0176 -0.1397 0.8465 0.2009 -1.1237 0.0005 0.7390 15755.24
(0.0028) (0.0151) (0.0047) (0.3980) (2.1537) (0.0000) (0.0138)
Maximum likelihood estimates of the PS model (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The parameters
κQ, θQ, and σQ denote the mean-reversion, long-run mean and instantaneous volatility of default intensity
process λQ under the risk-neutral probability measure, respectively. Similar convention applies for the
parameters of the objective measure (P). The parameter σM is the standard deviation of mispricing errors,
and RQ denotes the recovery rate. LogLk is the value of log-likelihood function. Data frequency is weekly
and comprises from January 2006 to November 2012, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, UK and US,
which covers from December 2007 to November 2012.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the noise measure in sovereign CDS contracts
Percentiles
Country Mean Median Std Min Max 5% 95% Obs.
Argentina 85.70 43.87 136.40 4.41 1111.39 7.84 472.10 358
Australia 4.42 2.66 4.67 0.33 21.44 1.28 17.47 244
Brazil 12.11 10.78 9.46 1.06 57.31 2.54 32.18 358
China 7.44 4.96 6.10 0.40 27.90 1.22 18.76 358
France 5.80 3.80 5.89 0.42 28.09 1.18 19.51 358
Germany 4.52 3.11 4.37 0.37 18.75 0.61 15.08 358
Indonesia 17.79 12.47 19.06 1.39 219.45 4.77 59.08 358
Italy 11.37 5.85 11.13 1.62 66.65 2.88 59.08 358
Japan 5.80 4.66 4.91 0.41 26.19 0.82 15.18 358
Mexico 7.87 6.68 4.93 1.49 56.84 2.36 16.25 358
Saudi Arabia 5.58 4.92 3.91 0.85 18.24 1.05 14.62 228
South Africa 9.91 7.90 7.01 2.02 56.34 3.01 21.92 358
South Korea 9.48 7.80 6.45 2.21 43.66 2.97 21.58 358
Spain 10.11 6.33 10.19 1.09 62.43 1.60 30.39 358
UK 6.84 5.33 3.83 1.40 17.75 2.52 13.65 261
US 4.57 3.87 2.73 0.53 17.22 1.12 10.52 257
Main descriptive statistics of the noise measure (in basis points) computed from the PS model in sovereign
CDS spreads for each country. Sample period comprises from January 2006 to November 2012, with the
exception of Australia, Saudi Arabia, UK and US, which covers from December 2007 to November 2012.
Data frequency is weekly.
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Table 3: Relative (%) contribution of each maturity to the noise measure
Maturity (years) Top ranking
Country 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 mean median
Argentina 59.20 39.44 26.28 12.86 9.63 16.62 20.82 23.33 25.03 1 1
[64.57] [43.48] [25.96] [10.96] [ 8.29] [14.41] [19.09] [21.70] [22.06]
Australia 32.54 33.99 29.68 18.34 19.84 29.79 35.43 35.42 36.84 10 8
[30.35] [36.81] [31.98] [18.85] [22.82] [33.45] [40.18] [38.99] [38.73]
Brazil 45.51 38.02 29.17 19.19 12.34 23.07 27.54 31.48 34.65 1 1
[46.10] [39.11] [29.16] [18.09] [12.82] [23.98] [30.13] [34.35] [37.58]
China 32.38 30.05 26.99 14.22 13.20 25.63 32.53 39.17 43.48 10 10
[34.97] [31.72] [25.91] [14.35] [13.62] [25.53] [34.76] [42.11] [42.66]
France 51.69 38.86 26.43 14.83 12.67 21.10 26.06 29.84 33.23 1 1
[56.95] [40.00] [26.19] [15.18] [12.14] [20.01] [25.56] [30.26] [34.31]
Germany 49.90 34.25 27.66 16.30 13.11 20.94 26.09 30.20 34.33 1 1
[48.16] [36.11] [27.80] [16.30] [11.94] [20.13] [27.57] [31.35] [36.45]
Indonesia 49.28 39.09 32.23 16.00 11.43 19.19 23.36 27.70 33.67 1 1
[52.52] [42.88] [33.74] [15.08] [10.67] [18.37] [24.69] [29.56] [35.59]
Italy 56.68 38.35 23.07 10.55 9.94 15.84 20.30 25.74 31.62 1 1
[62.50] [40.10] [20.12] [ 9.43] [ 9.05] [15.53] [17.83] [19.83] [25.89]
Japan 50.76 31.10 23.50 15.25 13.70 20.94 26.14 30.73 36.03 1 1
[51.81] [32.09] [24.07] [14.62] [12.44] [20.40] [27.52] [33.80] [39.31]
Mexico 54.74 31.38 22.05 12.71 10.24 18.80 24.04 29.20 37.42 1 1
[60.15] [33.05] [20.11] [12.02] [10.10] [17.59] [24.48] [29.36] [39.57]
Saudi Arabia 45.83 42.25 29.08 14.18 14.26 21.43 23.37 23.34 26.08 1 2
[49.00] [51.60] [30.30] [14.85] [11.00] [ 8.74] [15.14] [23.76] [30.92]
South Africa 51.74 43.14 28.56 12.90 10.93 18.72 23.76 27.86 32.05 1 1
[53.49] [44.69] [29.00] [12.43] [10.94] [18.02] [24.78] [29.52] [32.61]
South Korea 42.58 33.18 24.65 13.73 11.50 21.41 28.55 34.73 39.56 1 1
[46.70] [38.94] [23.62] [10.74] [11.11] [20.69] [27.83] [33.22] [35.31]
Spain 53.61 38.12 26.17 13.42 11.38 17.79 22.64 26.79 32.24 1 1
[53.09] [35.18] [26.45] [11.47] [10.33] [18.63] [21.77] [25.95] [28.97]
UK 44.92 43.73 36.82 17.47 12.07 19.81 24.12 26.39 27.64 1 2
[43.98] [50.74] [35.30] [15.47] [11.30] [18.64] [22.98] [26.30] [27.88]
US 26.93 32.76 26.99 13.86 12.71 22.44 32.78 41.59 48.62 10 10
[22.47] [32.93] [26.16] [14.21] [13.68] [25.36] [35.99] [45.79] [53.52]
Main descriptive statistics for the relative contribution (in percentage) of different maturities to the noise
measure computed from the PS model: Mean and median (in brackets). The relative contribution of the
5-year maturity is zero by construction and, hence, omitted. The final columns show the top maturity
contributor according to the average and medians.
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Table 4: OLS regressions of the first principal component of the noise measure
Constant ∆VIX ∆Default Market Return ∆PC1netvol ∆PC1BA5y Adj-R2 Obs.
0.0397 0.0616∗∗∗ 18.20 227
(0.0353) (0.0086)
0.0413 1.8627∗∗∗ 5.00 227
(0.0381) (0.5188)
0.0415 -0.0027∗∗∗ 21.79 227
(0.0346) (0.0003)
0.0426 -0.4468 1.38 185
(0.0410) (0.2366)
0.0371 -0.2316∗∗∗ 10.99 227
(0.0369) (0.0431)
0.0633 0.0366∗ -0.0273 -0.0016∗ -0.4358∗ -0.1173 25.75 185
(0.0364) (0.0183) (0.7145) (0.0007) (0.2107) (0.0778)
OLS estimates (Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis) of the increments of the first principal compo-
nent of the PS-based noise measure (∆PC1) on the explanatory variables in columns. Last columns show the
adjusted R-squared statistic and the number of observations in each regression. Total sample period spans
from July 2008 to November 2012. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Time-series dynamics of price discrepancies in sovereign CDS contracts
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This Figure displays the evolution of different percentiles of the noise measure using
Pan and Singleton (2008) model as pricing model. The noise measure is computed for
advanced (upper graph) and emerging (lower graph) economies. Advanced countries
comprise Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
US. The sample period spans from January 2006 to November 2012. Data frequency
is weekly.
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional median of sovereign CDS and qq-plots for different models
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Cross-sectional medians (left column) and qq-plots (right column) of sovereign CDS spreads. Each row compares
the different models. The first row shows the Pan and Singleton (2008) model against the quadratic intensity model
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The third row depicts the QIF model against the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model.
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Appendix A. Data analysis
This Appendix contains a complete description of the CDS spread data and different
variables related to their trading activity and liquidity.
Appendix A.1. CDS spreads
Figure A.1 shows the time series dynamics of the cross-sectional medians of the sovereign
CDS spreads at 1-, 5- and 10-year maturities over the total available sample, from January
1st, 2006 to November 9th, 2012. To account for likely structural differences across coun-
tries, we split the total sample into two subsamples. A first group is characterized by Ad-
vanced Economies (henceforth AE) and includes Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the UK, and the US. A second group is characterized by Emerging Economies
(henceforth EE) and is formed by the remaining countries in the sample.
For both subsamples, the cross-sectional medians increase monotonically from 1- to
10-year maturities, thereby revealing an upward slope in the CDS spreads term-structure
over the period. In addition, CDS spreads exhibit time-varying dynamics with consid-
erable sensitivity to episodes of financial distress. More specifically, CDS spreads show
similar responses to the largest systemic shocks over the period, peaking after the defaults
of Bear Stearns (March 2008) and Lehman Brothers (September 2008). Although this pat-
tern is clearly visible for both AE and EE groups, there are idiosyncratic patterns across
countries that can be related to creditworthiness differences and that are worth discussing
in detail. In particular, while the average CDS spreads in the AE group exhibit mod-
erate values before the default of Bear Stearns at the different maturities, they increase
steadily until mid 2011 as a consequence of the European debt crisis. These series exhibit
a mean-reverting behavior in the final part of the sample, when the concerns in the Euro-
zone dissipated and default probabilities reverted to lower levels. On the other hand, while
CDS spreads in the EE group largely increased around the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
they show resilience against the idiosyncratic shocks that featured the European debt cri-
sis. Lastly, CDS spreads in the AE group have a lower median and lower volatility than
CDS spreads in EE group. The maximum cross-sectional median value rose to 450 basis
points for emerging countries after Lehman Brother’s collapse, while the peak in advanced
economies was around 200 basis points in the midst of the European crisis.
Table A.1 reports the usual descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation)
of CDS spreads for each country in the sample. For the ease of exposition, we report these
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Figure A.1: Cross-sectional median of sovereign CDS for different maturities
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Cross-sectional medians of sovereign CDS spreads of different maturities for advanced (upper graph) and
emerging (lower graph) economies. Advanced economies are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Spain, the UK and the US. The maturities of CDS contracts are 1-, 5- and 10-year, respectively. Vertical
bars denote some crisis events. The sample period spans from January 2006 to November 2012. Data
frequency is weekly. 2
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of sovereign CDS spreads
1 Year 5 Year 10 Year
Country Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Obs.
Argentina 855.99 417.60 1213.68 964.41 741.90 897.20 971.81 752.33 818.27 358
Australia 25.28 23.26 21.34 44.44 44.12 33.31 52.83 49.86 38.42 358
Brazil 66.68 54.89 58.44 145.45 125.15 68.66 183.24 159.82 65.94 358
China 36.40 28.02 34.56 75.08 70.66 52.20 91.33 85.87 56.96 358
France 28.43 18.64 34.56 58.68 36.59 63.73 67.95 40.01 72.10 358
Germany 13.70 10.12 14.09 33.20 30.34 30.68 41.87 32.98 38.59 358
Indonesia 115.81 69.65 135.04 220.09 174.77 146.64 267.99 227.39 134.62 358
Italy 105.96 51.38 136.00 148.06 99.36 157.39 152.20 103.43 149.60 358
Japan 18.74 13.78 18.48 51.68 49.84 40.56 67.74 61.69 53.23 358
Mexico 65.23 43.25 70.05 126.82 113.81 83.61 152.74 144.02 82.71 358
Saudi Arabia 80.46 78.08 33.46 115.66 105.33 52.18 126.61 116.90 54.03 228
South Africa 76.68 50.83 95.17 145.58 140.81 97.30 168.30 162.69 90.91 358
South Korea 72.14 45.62 90.36 107.71 97.71 91.43 122.58 115.01 89.50 358
Spain 115.71 61.41 130.30 154.04 93.08 163.13 153.47 94.36 154.73 358
UK 30.17 25.57 22.86 63.16 65.95 30.81 72.70 77.96 31.32 261
US 18.72 19.23 13.90 38.34 40.25 16.72 40.09 42.00 22.50 334
Summary of the main descriptive statistics of CDS spreads in levels for each country. Maturities are
1-, 5- and 10-year, respectively. Sample comprises from January 2006 to November 2012, with the
exception of Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US, which covers from December 2007 to November
2012. Data frequency is weekly.
statistics for the representative cases of 1-, 5-, and 10-year maturities, noting that a com-
plete analysis is available upon request. As expected from the previous discussion, there
are significant differences in average spreads across maturities, consistent with the upward
slope of the term structure discussed previously. Argentina is the economy with the low-
est creditworthiness in the sample. Accordingly, the mean 5-year maturity CDS spread is
964.41, considerably greater than the spread of any other country in the sample. This series
also exhibits a massive degree of volatility, given by a standard deviation of 897.20, which
is caused by extreme observations in the upper tail recorded after the Lehman Brother’s
collapse. As discussed previously, there is a meaningful mean-volatility pattern in CDS
spreads such that countries with higher spreads tend to consistently exhibit higher volatil-
ity levels as well. This result suggests that investors are more sensitive to news affecting
default probabilities when creditworthiness is low. Not surprisingly Germany, widely seen
as the safe haven by investors, is the economy with the overall best credit creditworthiness
in the sample. The mean spread values for the 5-year German CDS contract is 33.20, with
a standard deviation of 30.68, the smallest among the different countries analyzed.
Previous literature on CDS have put forward the existence of a strong degree of com-
monality in sovereign CDS spreads. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the stan-
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dardized CDS spread series confirms the existence of a strong commonality in the behav-
ior of sovereign spreads. In particular, the first principal component (PC1) of the system
explains approximately 74% of the total cross-country variation, which increases to nearly
88% when a second principal component (PC2) is included. Interestingly, the previous lit-
erature has not discussed whether the degree of commonality tends to be stable over time
or exhibits time-varying patterns. Note that, for instance, a sharp reduction in the explana-
tory power of the first principal component will be indicative of idiosyncratic patterns that
would likely lead to greater pricing errors. Because this question is particularly relevant
in the context of this paper, we perform a dynamic PCA analysis, computing the principal
components on the basis of the 100 most recent observations at any time in the sample on
the basis of a rolling-window approach.
Figure A.2 shows the time series dynamics of the proportions of explained cross-
country variability which are related to either the conditional PC1, or PC1 and PC2, given
the 1-, 5- and 10-year maturities. Some interesting results emerge from this analysis. First,
the share of variability explained by PC1 sharply declined from 90% to approximately 40%
during the summer of 2011. This sheer decay affected all maturities and can be related to
the European sovereign debt crisis. Adding a second factor reduces the magnitude of this
decline, allowing the share total variability explained to reach about 65%, but still far from
the average level achieved before this episode. Figure A.2 also shows that the proportion
of explained variance over the total tends to be higher as the maturity increases, espe-
cially after August 2011. Finally, the levels of total variability explained by the first two
principal components eventually reverted to the level observed before July 2011, with the
exception of the 1-year maturity. Overall, this simple descriptive analysis suggests that a
single factor (roughly corresponding with PC1) may not be able to consistently capture
the full variation in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads over time. Furthermore,
there are important differences across the maturities that characterize the term structure,
with the 1-year CDS contract exhibiting a more idiosyncratic behavior. As discussed in ?,
the most likely reason being that liquidity is lower at this maturity.
Appendix A.2. Trading activity and liquidity-related data
Together with CDS spreads, we observe different variables related to trading activity
and liquidity. These variables are provided by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corpora-
tion (DTCC), which reports public information about real transactions of CDS contracts
4
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Figure A.2: Evolution of principal components over time
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Evolution of the aggregated explained variance of three first principal components
using a rolling window scheme. Each window contains 100 observations.
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since November 2008. In particular, we observe both the gross and net notional CDS po-
sitions, and the number of outstanding contracts in the CDS market. The gross notional
value is the aggregate sum of the CDS contracts bought or sold for a single reference entity.
The net notional values represents the aggregate net funds transference between protection
sellers and buyers that could be required upon the occurrence of a credit event relating to a
particular reference entity. Finally, the number of contracts reports the outstanding number
of contracts for a given reference.
The sovereign CDS market has become one of the most active markets in the after-
math of the financial crisis. The relative volume of the sovereign CDS contracts traded is
particularly sizeable. According to DTCC, the gross notational outstanding ranges from
USD 0.71 trillions in November 14th, 2008 to USD 1.70 trillions in November 9th, 2012,
showing the sharp increase in trading activity in CDS markets over recent years as a con-
sequence of the financial crisis. Similarly, the net notional outstanding ranges from USD
0.08 trillions to USD 0.15 trillions over the same period. These series show a considerably
degree of commonality across countries, reflecting the existence of common world-wide
trends. For instance, the PC1 on either the gross or net notional outstanding series accounts
for nearly 76% of the total variation of these series (a complete analysis is available upon
request). Because the central premise in this paper is that mispricing in CDS markets can
be related to illiquidity, Tables A.2 and A.3 report descriptive statistics on trading activity
and liquidity based on these variables.
Table A.2 provides a summary of the weekly increments of the number of outstanding
contracts, and the gross and net notional positions of the sovereign CDS written on the
countries under study. For comparative purposes, we also include the relative position of
the contracts with respect to the remaining G20 countries, i.e., the ratio of each country
over the total G-20 group. The sample available spans the period November 14th, 2008 to
November 9th, 2012. Note that, since trade-related information is not available for Saudi
Arabia, this country has been excluded from the analysis. The weekly average increment in
the number of contracts over the sample period is of approximately 20 contracts, with the
mean gross and net position sizes reaching USD 318.23 and 20.63 millions, respectively.
Trading activity is far from being homogeneous across the different countries in the period
analyzed. In particular, Italy and Spain show the highest increments in the number of
contracts and gross outstanding volumes, reflecting the financial tensions of these countries
during the European debt crisis. Similarly, the overall net position on CDS has largely
6
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increased for other advanced economies in the EMU area, particularly, France, suggesting
effects related to financial contagion. The average of net notional CDS positions over the
period is negative for Argentina and Spain, and tends to exhibit larger positive values for
the economies with better creditworthiness in the sample. Negative values of this variable
can be related to offsetting transactions in the CDS market. In this way, the net volume
can be taken as a crude proxy for professional arbitrage activity and will play a major role
in the analysis of determinants in Section 4 of the article.
Table A.3 reports descriptive statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for the
bid-ask spreads of CDS contracts for each country. For conciseness, we report these de-
scriptives at 1-, 5- and 10-year maturities, noting that a complete study on all maturities
is available upon request. In addition, Table A.3 reports descriptive statistics for the so-
called veracity index, an indicator of data reliability at each maturity elaborated directly
by the data provider. The analysis on bid-ask spreads essentially reveals the same features
discussed previously. Clearly, there exists a negative relationship between bid-ask spread
and creditworthiness. Countries with lower default probabilities exhibit smaller bid-ask
spreads uniformly over the maturities. Similarly, and consistent with the previous discus-
sion, the CDS with higher average bid-ask spreads are also the more volatile, showing
a greater disagreement on fundamental values. In particular, while Germany and France
are the countries with the lowest bid-ask averages and standard deviations, Argentina and
Saudi Arabia in the EE group exhibit the highest values of these statistics in the sample.
Interestingly, the average bid-ask spreads are higher at the 1-year maturity, suggesting that
sovereign CDS investors seem to incorporate their liquidity concerns about a country in
the short-term maturities of the curve, as pointed out by Pan and Singleton (2008). Finally,
the analysis on the veracity index reveals similar values with no particular pattern across
countries, indicating that the CDS sample is representative of the real trade quotes finally
traded in the market.
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Appendix B. Loading coefficients for principal components of the noise measure
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Appendix C. Panel-data estimates of noise determinants to alternative classifica-
tions of creditworthiness
In order to gain further insight on the role played by the creditworthiness, we have
gathered the sovereign CDS sample according to the investment- and speculative-grade
status of the bonds to explore the role played by the creditworthiness in our results. We
have considered two subsamples formed by AAA to A and BBB to B rated sovereigns. The
first group is formed by Australia, China, France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, UK and US, the second by the remaining countries. These results are provided in
Tables C.4 and C.5.
11
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Ta
bl
e
C
.4
:P
an
el
-d
at
a
es
tim
at
es
of
no
is
e
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
fo
rA
A
A
to
A
ra
te
d
so
ve
re
ig
ns
Tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r
Pa
ne
da
ta
Fi
xe
d
E
ff
ec
ts
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
lF
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
Pr
ed
ic
tiv
e
Tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lA
.-
M
od
el
I
lo
gB
id
as
ks
pr
ea
d5
Y
0.
33
35
0.
15
47
0.
03
0.
33
35
0.
15
36
0.
07
0.
33
43
0.
05
93
0.
00
0.
31
48
0.
15
42
0.
04
lo
gC
on
tr
ac
ts
0.
50
43
0.
25
14
0.
05
0.
50
43
0.
24
63
0.
08
0.
50
71
0.
05
97
0.
00
0.
48
66
0.
25
18
0.
05
lo
gN
et
vo
lu
m
e
-0
.2
18
9
0.
20
33
0.
28
-0
.2
18
9
0.
20
07
0.
31
-0
.2
22
6
0.
07
58
0.
00
-0
.1
90
6
0.
20
38
0.
35
M
ar
ke
tv
ol
at
ili
ty
0.
30
12
0.
66
20
0.
65
0.
30
12
0.
62
15
0.
64
0.
42
87
0.
71
41
0.
55
0.
27
43
0.
38
86
0.
48
D
ef
au
lt
0.
31
07
0.
14
42
0.
03
0.
31
07
0.
13
90
0.
06
0.
32
17
0.
04
18
0.
00
0.
32
85
0.
14
47
0.
02
C
on
st
an
t
-7
.0
59
9
3.
15
61
0.
03
-6
.7
70
2
2.
99
69
0.
06
-6
.7
26
8
1.
30
25
0.
00
0.
45
59
2.
94
25
0.
88
C
ou
nt
ry
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
15
19
15
19
15
19
15
19
15
19
15
19
15
05
15
05
15
05
15
05
15
05
15
05
R
2-
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
0.
92
64
0.
92
64
0.
92
64
0.
92
64
0.
92
64
0.
92
64
-
-
-
0.
92
59
0.
92
59
0.
92
59
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lB
.-M
od
el
II
lo
gB
id
as
ks
pr
ea
d5
Y
0.
42
66
0.
13
52
0.
00
0.
42
66
0.
13
28
0.
02
0.
43
62
0.
03
75
0.
00
0.
41
10
0.
12
74
0.
00
∆l
og
C
on
tr
ac
ts
-0
.0
55
7
0.
51
88
0.
92
-0
.0
55
7
0.
49
16
0.
91
-0
.0
44
0
0.
42
83
0.
92
0.
00
76
0.
48
95
0.
99
∆l
og
N
et
vo
lu
m
e
-1
.5
74
8
0.
68
89
0.
02
-1
.5
74
8
0.
62
59
0.
04
-1
.6
64
3
0.
46
40
0.
00
-1
.9
38
4
0.
59
46
0.
00
∆M
ar
ke
tv
ol
at
ili
ty
0.
25
21
0.
42
06
0.
55
0.
25
21
0.
27
47
0.
39
0.
22
69
0.
58
55
0.
70
0.
10
90
0.
42
63
0.
80
∆D
ef
au
lt
0.
09
72
0.
65
23
0.
88
0.
09
72
0.
57
88
0.
87
0.
20
39
0.
27
77
0.
46
-0
.1
05
5
0.
66
26
0.
87
C
on
st
an
t
-7
.9
16
4
0.
15
16
0.
00
-7
.5
78
2
0.
18
76
0.
00
-7
.5
91
1
0.
05
46
0.
00
-7
.9
01
9
0.
14
28
0.
00
C
ou
nt
ry
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
15
11
15
11
15
11
15
11
15
11
15
11
15
03
15
03
15
03
15
03
15
03
15
03
R
2-
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
0.
91
34
0.
91
34
0.
91
34
0.
91
34
0.
91
34
0.
91
34
-
-
-
0.
91
27
0.
91
27
0.
91
27
Pa
ne
ld
at
a
es
tim
at
es
fo
r
no
is
e
m
ea
su
re
us
in
g
di
ff
er
en
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
es
tim
at
io
n
m
et
ho
ds
fo
r
hi
gh
qu
al
ity
co
un
tr
ie
s
(A
us
tr
al
ia
,C
hi
na
,F
ra
nc
e,
G
er
m
an
y,
Ja
pa
n,
Sa
ud
iA
ra
bi
a,
So
ut
h
K
or
ea
,U
K
an
d
U
S)
.T
he
m
is
pr
ic
in
g
er
ro
rs
ha
ve
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Pa
n
an
d
Si
ng
le
to
n
(2
00
8)
m
od
el
.
Pa
ne
lA
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
su
lts
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
le
ve
ls
an
d
Pa
ne
lB
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
di
ff
er
en
ce
s.
Fi
rs
tc
ol
um
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
w
ith
po
ol
ed
tim
e-
se
ri
es
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
w
ith
tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r-
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ac
co
un
tin
g
fo
rc
ou
nt
ry
an
d
w
ee
k
cl
us
te
rs
.S
ec
on
d
co
lu
m
n
sh
ow
s
th
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
w
ith
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
to
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
an
d
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
.T
he
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
ns
pr
es
en
tt
he
es
tim
at
io
n
fo
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
tw
o-
cl
us
te
ru
si
ng
la
gg
ed
re
gr
es
so
rs
.
12
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Ta
bl
e
C
.5
:P
an
el
-d
at
a
es
tim
at
es
of
no
is
e
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
fo
rB
B
B
to
B
ra
te
d
so
ve
re
ig
ns
Tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r
Pa
ne
da
ta
Fi
xe
d
E
ff
ec
ts
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
lF
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
Pr
ed
ic
tiv
e
Tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lA
.-
M
od
el
I
lo
gB
id
as
ks
pr
ea
d5
Y
0.
57
42
0.
07
41
0.
00
0.
57
42
0.
06
93
0.
00
0.
58
29
0.
04
05
0.
00
0.
55
37
0.
08
66
0.
00
lo
gC
on
tr
ac
ts
0.
87
45
0.
13
57
0.
00
0.
87
45
0.
12
68
0.
00
0.
83
94
0.
07
33
0.
00
0.
87
44
0.
13
88
0.
00
lo
gN
et
vo
lu
m
e
-0
.3
09
5
0.
12
92
0.
02
-0
.3
09
5
0.
12
56
0.
04
-0
.2
72
4
0.
08
04
0.
00
-0
.2
53
0
0.
10
98
0.
02
M
ar
ke
tv
ol
at
ili
ty
1.
10
88
0.
57
82
0.
06
1.
10
88
0.
50
76
0.
07
1.
05
17
0.
61
73
0.
09
0.
07
95
0.
31
52
0.
80
D
ef
au
lt
0.
06
01
0.
08
23
0.
47
0.
06
01
0.
07
69
0.
46
0.
07
34
0.
04
14
0.
08
0.
10
21
0.
09
16
0.
27
C
on
st
an
t
-8
.1
62
5
3.
63
45
0.
03
-7
.6
91
6
3.
34
60
0.
06
-8
.2
51
3
1.
74
51
0.
00
-9
.4
76
1
2.
82
30
0.
00
C
ou
nt
ry
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
16
12
16
12
16
12
16
12
16
12
16
12
15
96
15
96
15
96
15
96
15
96
15
96
R
2-
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
0.
94
80
0.
94
80
0.
94
80
0.
94
80
0.
94
80
0.
94
80
-
-
-
0.
94
75
0.
94
75
0.
94
75
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
.E
rr
or
p-
va
lu
e
Pa
ne
lB
.-M
od
el
II
lo
gB
id
as
ks
pr
ea
d5
Y
0.
63
85
0.
04
95
0.
00
0.
63
85
0.
04
79
0.
00
0.
64
89
0.
02
52
0.
00
0.
62
71
0.
05
37
0.
00
∆l
og
C
on
tr
ac
ts
-0
.2
23
7
0.
55
15
0.
69
-0
.2
23
7
0.
48
82
0.
66
-0
.2
58
0
0.
44
88
0.
57
-0
.1
75
9
0.
51
74
0.
73
∆l
og
N
et
vo
lu
m
e
0.
05
47
0.
54
34
0.
92
0.
05
47
0.
55
41
0.
92
0.
03
88
0.
51
27
0.
94
0.
09
22
0.
43
80
0.
83
∆M
ar
ke
tv
ol
at
ili
ty
0.
30
99
0.
45
66
0.
50
0.
30
99
0.
41
87
0.
48
0.
20
71
0.
48
63
0.
67
0.
08
19
0.
29
03
0.
78
∆D
ef
au
lt
-0
.5
22
5
0.
57
01
0.
36
-0
.5
22
5
0.
55
13
0.
38
-0
.3
01
0
0.
27
24
0.
27
-0
.3
33
2
0.
57
95
0.
57
C
on
st
an
t
-6
.9
58
5
0.
16
48
0.
00
-7
.0
21
4
0.
08
87
0.
00
-7
.0
35
4
0.
04
70
0.
00
-7
.9
61
3
0.
19
18
0.
00
C
ou
nt
ry
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
16
04
16
04
16
04
16
04
16
04
16
04
15
94
15
94
15
94
15
94
15
94
15
94
R
2-
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
0.
94
26
0.
94
26
0.
94
26
0.
94
26
0.
94
26
0.
94
26
-
-
-
0.
94
2
0.
94
2
0.
94
2
Pa
ne
ld
at
a
es
tim
at
es
fo
r
no
is
e
m
ea
su
re
us
in
g
di
ff
er
en
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
es
tim
at
io
n
m
et
ho
ds
fo
r
lo
w
qu
al
ity
co
un
tr
ie
s
(A
rg
en
tin
a,
B
ra
zi
l,
In
do
ne
si
a,
It
al
y,
M
ex
ic
o,
So
ut
h
A
fr
ic
a
an
d
Sp
ai
n)
.
T
he
m
is
pr
ic
in
g
er
ro
rs
ha
ve
be
en
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
Pa
n
an
d
Si
ng
le
to
n
(2
00
8)
m
od
el
.
Pa
ne
l
A
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
su
lts
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
le
ve
ls
an
d
Pa
ne
l
B
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
di
ff
er
en
ce
s.
Fi
rs
t
co
lu
m
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
w
ith
po
ol
ed
tim
e-
se
ri
es
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
l
re
gr
es
si
on
s
w
ith
tw
o-
w
ay
cl
us
te
r-
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ac
co
un
tin
g
fo
r
co
un
tr
y
an
d
w
ee
k
cl
us
te
rs
.
Se
co
nd
co
lu
m
n
sh
ow
s
th
e
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
w
ith
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
to
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
an
d
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
.T
he
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
ns
pr
es
en
tt
he
es
tim
at
io
n
fo
rfi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
tw
o-
cl
us
te
ru
si
ng
la
gg
ed
re
gr
es
so
rs
.
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